linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX

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Message-ID: <aTdWbayU8BbR6eFu@google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2025 14:51:25 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@...or.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, corbet@....net, 
	tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, 
	dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com, luto@...nel.org, 
	peterz@...radead.org, andrew.cooper3@...rix.com, chao.gao@...el.com, 
	hch@...radead.org, sohil.mehta@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX

On Sun, Oct 26, 2025, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> Xin Li (18):
>   KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls
>   KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config
>   KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
>   KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields
>   KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts
>   KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0
>   KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs
>   KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU
>   KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data
>   KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
>   KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved
>   KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
>   KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED
>   KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls
>   KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context
>   KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields
>   KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks
>   KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls
> 
> Xin Li (Intel) (4):

I'm guessing the two different "names" isn't intended?

>   x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_
>   x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access
>   x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM
>   KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception