linux-kernel - Forwarded: [PATCH] ocfs2: validate inline directory i

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Message-ID: <693a8e8b.050a0220.4004e.02f8.GAE@google.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2025 01:27:39 -0800
From: syzbot <syzbot+c897823f699449cc3eb4@...kaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Forwarded: [PATCH] ocfs2: validate inline directory i_size during
 inode read

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com.

***

Subject: [PATCH] ocfs2: validate inline directory i_size during inode read
Author: kartikey406@...il.com

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs
various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline
directories. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inline directory's
i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count).

This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline
data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory
entries from freed memory.

In the syzbot report:
  - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
  - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes
  - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds
  - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()

Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
ensure inline directories have i_size <= id_count. This catches the
corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code
from operating on invalid data.

Reported-by: syzbot+c897823f699449cc3eb4@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c897823f699449cc3eb4
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@...il.com>
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 8340525e5589..9eb364bef5c3 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1521,6 +1521,21 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		}
 	}

+	if (S_ISDIR(le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode)) &&
+	    (di->i_dyn_features & cpu_to_le16(OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL))) {
+		struct ocfs2_inline_data *data = &di->id2.i_data;
+
+		if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
+			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
+					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline directory "
+					 "i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",
+					 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+					 (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(di->i_size),
+					 le16_to_cpu(data->id_count));
+			goto bail;
+		}
+	}
+
 	rc = 0;

 bail:
-- 
2.43.0