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Message-ID: <ffcb4a42c29f98fada076958f069c094164cad79.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2025 14:50:13 +0900
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Blaise Boscaccy
<bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>, "Dr. David Alan
Gilbert" <linux@...blig.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 04/11] crypto: pkcs7: add flag for validated trust on a
signed info block
On Fri, 2025-12-12 at 09:45 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Note that there are two other potentially conflicting sets of changes
> to the PKCS#7 code that will need to be coordinated: ML-DSA support
> and RSASSA-PSS support. The former wants to do the hashing itself,
> the latter requires signature parameters.
I don't think there'll be a conflict. The only changes this makes is
to add an API that exposes the attributes. It shouldn't have any
effect on the way signatures are currently verified.
>From the use case patches it looks like we could simply get the struct
pkcs7 verified by calling verify_pkcs7_message_sig() as long as the
symbol is exported; Initially I didn't think they'd have access to the
content to reverify, so I added the extra patches to break out the
validate_pkcs7_trust() calls, but I don't think they're necessary now.
Regards,
James
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