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Message-ID: <20251214180254.799969-1-danilklishch@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2025 13:02:54 -0500
From: Dan Klishch <danilklishch@...il.com>
To: legion@...nel.org
Cc: containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
ebiederm@...ssion.com,
keescook@...omium.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH v6 0/5] proc: subset=pid: Relax check of mount visibility
On 12/14/25 11:40 AM, Alexey Gladkov wrote:
> But then, if I understand you correctly, this patch will not be enough
> for you. procfs with subset=pid will not allow you to have /proc/meminfo,
> /proc/cpuinfo, etc.
Hmm, I didn't think of this. sunwalker-box only exposes cpuinfo and PID
tree to the sandboxed programs (empirically, this is enough for most of
programs you want sandboxing for). With that in mind, this patch and a
FUSE providing an overlay with cpuinfo / seccomp intercepting opens of
/proc/cpuinfo / a small kernel patch with a new mount option for procfs
to expose more static files still look like a clean solution to me.
>> Also, correct me if I am wrong, installing ebpf controller requires
>> CAP_BPF in initial userns, so rootless podman will not be able to mask
>> /proc "properly" even if someone sends a patch switching it to ebpf.
>
> You can turn on /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled.
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled
0
$ unshare -pfr --mount-proc
$ ./proc-controller -p deny /proc/cpuinfo
libbpf: prog 'proc_access_restrict': BPF program load failed: Operation not permitted
libbpf: prog 'proc_access_restrict': failed to load: -1
libbpf: failed to load object './proc-controller.bpf.o'
proc-controller: ERROR: loading BPF object file failed
I think only packet filters are allowed to be installed by non-root.
Thanks,
Dan Klishch
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