linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Use get

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Message-ID: <aUBuzsOx0x8EwatB@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2025 22:25:50 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
	"open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Use get_random-fallback for TPM

On Mon, Dec 15, 2025 at 09:01:49PM +0100, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Mon, 2025-12-15 at 21:43 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> [...]
> > I think there is misunderstanding with FIPS.
> > 
> > Having FIPS certificated RNG in TPM matters but it only matters only
> > in the sense that callers can be FIPS certified as they use that RNG
> > as a source.
> > 
> > Using FIPS certified RNG does not magically make callers be FIPS 
> > ceritified actors. The data is contaminated in that sense at the
> > point when kernel acquires it.
> 
> I think FIPS certification is a red herring.  The point being made in
> the original thread is about RNG quality.  The argument essentially
> being that the quality of the TPM RNG is known at all points in time
> but the quality of the kernel RNG (particularly at start of day when
> the entropy pool is new) is less certain.

OK, that's fair point.

I.e., using TPM2_GetRandom here makes sense, not because of FIPS
certification per se but because it is guarantees matching entropy to
other types of keys generated with TPM2_Create (as everything uses the
same RNG).

I can buy this but think it would really make sense to add a comment to
the source code.

I was thinking something along the lines of:

/*
 * tpm_get_random() is used here directly instead of relying kernel's
 * RNG in order to match RNGs with objects generated by TPM internally.
 */

It does not mention FIPS explicitly because I think this is already
enforcing condition and thus enough. And e.g., applies also when one
uses an emulator (and thus useful tidbit for that use and purpose).

> 
> Regards,
> 
> James
> 

BR, Jarkko