linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Use get

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Message-ID: <aUCXGlTiG2w6LYkW@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 01:17:46 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
	"open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Use get_random-fallback for TPM

On Tue, Dec 16, 2025 at 01:14:38AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> 1. tpm2_get_random() is costly when TCG_TPM2_HMAC is enabled and thus its
>    use should be pooled rather than directly used. This both reduces
>    latency and improves its predictability.
> 
> 2. Linux is better off overall if every subsystem uses the same source for
>    generating the random numbers required.
> 
> Thus, unset '.get_random', which causes fallback to kernel_get_random().
> 
> One might argue that TPM RNG should be used so that generated trusted keys
> have the matching entropy with the TPM internally generated objects.
> 
> This argument does some weight into it but as far cryptography goes, FIPS
> certification sets the exact bar, not which exact FIPS certified RNG will
> be used. Thus, the rational choice is obviously to pick the lowest latency
> path.
> 
> Finally, there also some actual defence in depth benefits on using kernel
> RNG. E.g., it helps to mitigate TPM firmware bugs concerning RNG
> implementation, which do happen in the wild occasionally.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> ---
> v2:
> - Added Eric's reviewed-by tag.
> - Addressed concerns from James by writing more details to the commit
>   message and documenting random number generation to the source
>   code.
> ---
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 6 ------
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 9 +++++++++
>  2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index 636acb66a4f6..33b7739741c3 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -936,11 +936,6 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> -static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
> -{
> -	return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);
> -}
> -
>  static int __init init_digests(void)
>  {
>  	int i;
> @@ -992,6 +987,5 @@ struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = {
>  	.init = trusted_tpm_init,
>  	.seal = trusted_tpm_seal,
>  	.unseal = trusted_tpm_unseal,
> -	.get_random = trusted_tpm_get_random,
>  	.exit = trusted_tpm_exit,
>  };
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index a7ea4a1c3bed..d16be47f1305 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -2,6 +2,15 @@
>  /*
>   * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
>   * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation
> +
> +/**
> + * DOC: Random Number Generation
> + *
> + * tpm_get_random() was previously used here as the RNG in order to have equal
> + * entropy with the objects fully inside the TPM. However, as far as goes,
> + * kernel RNG is equally fine, as long as long as it is FIPS certified. Also,
> + * using kernel RNG has the benefit of mitigating bugs in the TPM firmware
> + * associated with the RNG.
>   */

Sorry, this should have gone to trusted_tpm1.c :-)

>  
>  #include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
> -- 
> 2.39.5
> 

BR, Jarkko