linux-kernel - Forwarded: [PATCH] block: add allocation size check in blkdev_pr_read

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Message-ID: <6940e29d.a70a0220.33cd7b.0132.GAE@google.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2025 20:39:57 -0800
From: syzbot <syzbot+660d079d90f8a1baf54d@...kaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Forwarded: [PATCH] block: add allocation size check in blkdev_pr_read_keys()

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com.

***

Subject: [PATCH] block: add allocation size check in blkdev_pr_read_keys()
Author: kartikey406@...il.com

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

blkdev_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to
calculate the allocation size for keys_info via struct_size(). While
there is a check for SIZE_MAX (integer overflow), there is no upper
bound validation on the allocation size itself.

A malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that
doesn't trigger overflow but still results in an excessive allocation
attempt, causing a warning in the page allocator when the order exceeds
MAX_PAGE_ORDER.

Fix this by introducing PR_KEYS_MAX_NUM to limit the number of keys to
a sane value. This makes the SIZE_MAX check redundant, so remove it.
Also switch to kvzalloc/kvfree to handle larger allocations gracefully.

Fixes: 22a1ffea5f80 ("block: add IOC_PR_READ_KEYS ioctl")
Reported-by: syzbot+660d079d90f8a1baf54d@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=660d079d90f8a1baf54d
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@...il.com>
---
v2:
  - Added PR_KEYS_MAX_NUM (64K) limit instead of checking KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE
  - Removed redundant SIZE_MAX check
  - Switched to kvzalloc/kvfree
---
 block/ioctl.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/block/ioctl.c b/block/ioctl.c
index 61feed686418..98c4c7b9e7fe 100644
--- a/block/ioctl.c
+++ b/block/ioctl.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include "blk.h"
 #include "blk-crypto-internal.h"
 
+#define PR_KEYS_MAX_NUM		(1u << 16)
+
 static int blkpg_do_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev,
 			  struct blkpg_partition __user *upart, int op)
 {
@@ -442,11 +444,12 @@ static int blkdev_pr_read_keys(struct block_device *bdev, blk_mode_t mode,
 	if (copy_from_user(&read_keys, arg, sizeof(read_keys)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	keys_info_len = struct_size(keys_info, keys, read_keys.num_keys);
-	if (keys_info_len == SIZE_MAX)
+	if (read_keys.num_keys > PR_KEYS_MAX_NUM)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	keys_info = kzalloc(keys_info_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	keys_info_len = struct_size(keys_info, keys, read_keys.num_keys);
+
+	keys_info = kvzalloc(keys_info_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!keys_info)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -473,7 +476,7 @@ static int blkdev_pr_read_keys(struct block_device *bdev, blk_mode_t mode,
 	if (copy_to_user(arg, &read_keys, sizeof(read_keys)))
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 out:
-	kfree(keys_info);
+	kvfree(keys_info);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.43.0