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Message-ID: <27297f052a89a5e171bad743dd59f39a339ce126.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 07:18:51 +0100
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
To: Shipei Qu <qu@...knavy.com>, Adam Radford <aradford@...il.com>, "Martin
K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>
Cc: linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, DARKNAVY
<vr@...knavy.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] scsi: 3w-sas: validate request_id reported by
controller
On Tue, 2025-12-16 at 14:01 +0800, Shipei Qu wrote:
> This issue was first reported via security@...nel.org. The kernel
> security team replied that, under the usual upstream threat model
> (only trusted PCIe/Thunderbolt devices are allowed to bind to such
> drivers), it should be treated as a normal robustness bug rather than
> a security issue, and asked us to send fixes to the relevant
> development lists. This email follows that guidance.
Realistically the same rationale goes for us as well. Absent the
observation in the field of a problem device, we usually trust the
hardware, so unless you can find an actual device that exhibits the
problem this isn't really a fix for anything.
If the security@ list is happy that the existing trust model for
Thunderbolt/PCIe would prevent the attachment of malicious devices,
then I think we're also happy to take their word for it. Even if
thunderbolt were a security problem, the fix would likely be in the
trust model not in all possible drivers.
Regards,
James Bottomley
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