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Message-Id: <20251217181206.3681159-1-mlbnkm1@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2025 19:12:02 +0100
From: Melbin K Mathew <mlbnkm1@...il.com>
To: stefanha@...hat.com,
sgarzare@...hat.com
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
virtualization@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
mst@...hat.com,
jasowang@...hat.com,
xuanzhuo@...ux.alibaba.com,
eperezma@...hat.com,
davem@...emloft.net,
edumazet@...gle.com,
kuba@...nel.org,
pabeni@...hat.com,
horms@...nel.org,
Melbin K Mathew <mlbnkm1@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH net v4 0/4] vsock/virtio: fix TX credit handling
This series fixes TX credit handling in virtio-vsock:
Patch 1: Fix potential underflow in get_credit() using s64 arithmetic
Patch 2: Cap TX credit to local buffer size (security hardening)
Patch 3: Fix vsock_test seqpacket bounds test
Patch 4: Add stream TX credit bounds regression test
The core issue is that a malicious guest can advertise a huge buffer
size via SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE, causing the host to allocate
excessive sk_buff memory when sending data to that guest.
On an unpatched Ubuntu 22.04 host (~64 GiB RAM), running a PoC with
32 guest vsock connections advertising 2 GiB each and reading slowly
drove Slab/SUnreclaim from ~0.5 GiB to ~57 GiB; the system only
recovered after killing the QEMU process.
With this series applied, the same PoC shows only ~35 MiB increase in
Slab/SUnreclaim, no host OOM, and the guest remains responsive.
--
2.34.1
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