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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQ4=ALurNy_nBdqmdQ1dguupPnJ6KYAnU7B2UWhp9ydbA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 21:27:39 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: ryan foster <foster.ryan.r@...il.com>
Cc: bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com, James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org, corbet@....net,
dhowells@...hat.com, gnoack@...gle.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux@...blig.org, mic@...ikod.net,
serge@...lyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC 00/11] Reintroduce Hornet LSM
On Mon, Dec 15, 2025 at 12:26 PM ryan foster <foster.ryan.r@...il.com> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> I want to confirm I understand the current semantics, and specific issues this series is addressing.
I don't want to speak for Blaise (or James for that matter), but my
understanding is that Hornet is focused on ensuring BPF program
integrity at load time; similar to KP's signature scheme which has
recently found its way into Linus tree. Where KP's and Blaise's
scheme differ is in how they perform the integrity checks.
--
paul-moore.com
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