[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id:
<176715189629.3416240.5165553541798344765.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2025 03:31:36 +0000
From: patchwork-bot+linux-riscv@...nel.org
To: Lukas Gerlach <lukas.gerlach@...pa.de>
Cc: linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, palmer@...belt.com, pjw@...nel.org,
aou@...s.berkeley.edu, alex@...ti.fr, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
daniel.weber@...pa.de, michael.schwarz@...pa.de, marton.bognar@...euven.be,
jo.vanbulck@...euven.be
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] riscv: Add Spectre v1 mitigations
Hello:
This series was applied to riscv/linux.git (fixes)
by Paul Walmsley <pjw@...nel.org>:
On Thu, 18 Dec 2025 20:13:30 +0100 you wrote:
> This series adds Spectre v1 to RISC-V in line with x86 and arm64.
>
> Modern RISC-V CPUs with deep pipelines (e.g., XuanTie C910, SiFive P550)
> are susceptible to Spectre v1 attacks where an attacker can speculatively
> bypass bounds checks and leak kernel memory via cache side channels.
>
> The first patch adds pointer masking to uaccess routines. Similar to
> arm64's uaccess_mask_ptr(), this clears the top bit of user pointers
> before access, ensuring that even under speculation, a user-controlled
> pointer cannot reach kernel memory.
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [1/2] riscv: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
(no matching commit)
- [2/2] riscv: Sanitize syscall table indexing under speculation
https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/25fd7ee7bf58
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists