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Message-ID: <8d780b6eff19fd61096c07768cf730b985d29177.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 02 Jan 2026 15:30:20 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@...cle.com>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: ardb@...nel.org, bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
graf@...zon.com, guoweikang.kernel@...il.com, henry.willard@...cle.com,
hpa@...or.com, jbohac@...e.cz, joel.granados@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...hat.com, noodles@...com,
paul.x.webb@...cle.com, rppt@...nel.org, sohil.mehta@...el.com,
sourabhjain@...ux.ibm.com, stable@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
x86@...nel.org, yifei.l.liu@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] ima: verify the previous kernel's IMA buffer
lies in addressable RAM
On Tue, 2025-12-30 at 22:16 -0800, Harshit Mogalapalli wrote:
> When the second-stage kernel is booted with a limiting command line
> (e.g. "mem=<size>"), the IMA measurement buffer handed over from the
> previous kernel may fall outside the addressable RAM of the new kernel.
> Accessing such a buffer can fault during early restore.
>
> Introduce a small generic helper, ima_validate_range(), which verifies
> that a physical [start, end] range for the previous-kernel IMA buffer
> lies within addressable memory:
> - On x86, use pfn_range_is_mapped().
> - On OF based architectures, use page_is_ram().
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@...cle.com>
Thanks!
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
> v2->v3: Update subject to exactly describe the patch [ Suggested by Mimi
> Zohar]
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 8e29cb4e6a01..abf8923f8fc5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
> int __init ima_free_kexec_buffer(void);
> int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size);
> +int ima_validate_range(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size);
> #endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
> index 7362f68f2d8b..8b24e3312ea0 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
> #include <linux/kexec.h>
> #include <linux/of.h>
> #include <linux/ima.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/overflow.h>
> #include <linux/reboot.h>
> #include <asm/page.h>
> #include "ima.h"
> @@ -296,3 +298,36 @@ void __init ima_load_kexec_buffer(void)
> pr_debug("Error restoring the measurement list: %d\n", rc);
> }
> }
> +
> +/*
> + * ima_validate_range - verify a physical buffer lies in addressable RAM
> + * @phys: physical start address of the buffer from previous kernel
> + * @size: size of the buffer
> + *
> + * On success return 0. On failure returns -EINVAL so callers can skip
> + * restoring.
> + */
> +int ima_validate_range(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size)
> +{
> + unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn;
> + phys_addr_t end_phys;
> +
> + if (check_add_overflow(phys, (phys_addr_t)size - 1, &end_phys))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + start_pfn = PHYS_PFN(phys);
> + end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(end_phys);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86
> + if (!pfn_range_is_mapped(start_pfn, end_pfn))
> +#else
> + if (!page_is_ram(start_pfn) || !page_is_ram(end_pfn))
> +#endif
> + {
> + pr_warn("IMA: previous kernel measurement buffer %pa (size 0x%zx) lies outside available memory\n",
> + &phys, size);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
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