linux-kernel - [PATCH] x86/fred: Correct speculative safety in fred

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Message-Id: <20260106131504.679932-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Date: Tue,  6 Jan 2026 13:15:04 +0000
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
	Xin Li <xin@...or.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	x86@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH] x86/fred: Correct speculative safety in fred_extint()

array_index_nospec() is no use if the result gets spilled to the stack, as
it makes the believed safe-under-speculation value subject to memory
predictions.

For all practical purposes, this means array_index_nospec() must be used in
the expression that accesses the array.

As the code currently stands, it's the wrong side of irqentry_enter(), and
'index' is put into %ebp across the function call.

Remove the index variable and reposition array_index_nospec(), so it's
calculated immediately before the array access.

Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
---
CC: Xin Li <xin@...or.com>
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
CC: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
CC: x86@...nel.org
CC: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org

This is why we have array_access_nospec() in Xen, so you can't separate the
safety calculation from the array access.

The observant reader might notice that the result of reading sysvec_table[] is
also subject to memory predictions.  Aren't CPUs wonderful...

In practice, even having array_index_nospec() part of the array access
expression is no guarantee of avoiding spilling to the stack.  KASAN is liable
to hide a function call behind the scenes, while UBSAN is very good at
inserting it's own unsafe range checks around objects it knows the size of.
Aren't compilers wonderful...
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c b/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
index 94e626cc6a07..4fc5b176d3ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ void __init fred_complete_exception_setup(void)
 static noinstr void fred_extint(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned int vector = regs->fred_ss.vector;
-	unsigned int index = array_index_nospec(vector - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR,
-						NR_SYSTEM_VECTORS);
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vector < FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR))
 		return;
@@ -169,7 +167,8 @@ static noinstr void fred_extint(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);
 
 		instrumentation_begin();
-		sysvec_table[index](regs);
+		sysvec_table[array_index_nospec(vector - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR,
+						NR_SYSTEM_VECTORS)](regs);
 		instrumentation_end();
 		irqentry_exit(regs, state);
 	} else {

base-commit: 7f98ab9da046865d57c102fd3ca9669a29845f67
-- 
2.39.5