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Message-ID: <d2897ca4-b53a-4047-860f-c19d668505c4@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2026 00:18:57 +0530
From: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@...mlin.com>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@....com>
Cc: mingo@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, juri.lelli@...hat.com,
vincent.guittot@...aro.org, dietmar.eggemann@....com,
rostedt@...dmis.org, bsegall@...gle.com, mgorman@...e.de,
vschneid@...hat.com, neelx@...e.com, sean@...e.io, mproche@...il.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] sched/deadline: Log Fair Server re-enablement for
symmetry with debugfs
On 1/12/26 8:02 PM, Aaron Tomlin wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 12, 2026 at 10:44:03AM +0530, K Prateek Nayak wrote:
>> I believe the suggested solution to that was to trace the reason for the
>> kthread/fair task waking up on isolated CPUs and prevent the wakeup if
>> it is for some unnecessary operation as opposed to disabling the fair
>> server.
>
> Hi Prateek,
>
>> We have tools like https://docs.kernel.org/trace/osnoise-tracer.html to
>> capture these noise. Trace the noise, bring up the case where isolation
>> is broken on the current *upstream* kernel to the mailing list, and we
>> can solve it for everyone instead of disabling fair server as a duct
>> tape.
>
> Thank you for your insights.
>
> I fully concur that, in an ideal world, the "correct" solution is
> invariably to identify and eliminate the root cause of any spurious
> SCHED_NORMAL wakeups on isolated CPUs. Tools such as the osnoise tracer are
> indeed invaluable for this pursuit.
>
> However, I would respectfully submit that there remains a distinction
> between the theoretical purity of the kernel and the pragmatic reality of
> managing highly specialised, latency-critical partitions.
>
> It is pertinent to note that the kernel currently affords users the
> capability to manually modify the Fair Server's parameters via
> /sys/kernel/debug/sched/fair_server/. As this resides within debugfs, it
> is, by definition, a debug-only interface and not strictly considered
> "production safe" or guaranteed to be free from side effects. The capacity
> for a user to destabilise their system via this interface - effectively
> "shooting themselves in the foot" - already exists. This existing interface
> is useful for educated users who are willing to accept full accountability
> for system stability in exchange for absolute determinism for a defined
> period of time.
>
>> Juri, Peter, is changing the fair server's bandwidth frequently very
>> common scenario is the field?
>>
>> If not, can we add a pr_warn() for when the fair server's parameters
>> are changed by the userspace just to catch any absurd values that
>> reduce the bandwidth to a minimum without disabling the server?
>>
>> I can do something absolutely stupid like this without dmesg logging
>> anything that would indicate I'm being stupid:
>>
>> # echo 4000000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/sched/fair_server/cpu0/period
>> # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/sched/fair_server/cpu0/runtime
>> # sudo taskset -c 0 chrt -r 99 ~/scripts/loop&
>> # taskset -c 0 bash -c 'mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/cg0; echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/cg0/cgroup.procs;'
>>
>> ... wait for a while
>>
>> INFO: task bash:4272 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
>> Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1-tip+ #162
>> "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
>> task:bash state:D stack:0 pid:4272 tgid:4272 ppid:4271 task_flags:0x400100 flags:0x00080000
>>
>>
>> A taint might be too far but a log should be acceptable?
>
> Regarding your valid concern about visibility and safety: I am agreeable to
> hardening the observability of such changes. In the next iteration, I
> propose to introduce a pr_warn() that triggers whenever the Fair Server's
> runtime or period is modified from its default value (50 * NSEC_PER_MSEC
> and 1000 * NSEC_PER_MSEC). This will ensure that any deviation - whether it
> be a complete disablement or a reduction to unsafe levels - is clearly
> logged, rightfully alerting administrators to the non-standard
> configuration without removing the latitude required by those who
> explicitly need to make that trade-off.
>
Currently it is 5%. It is going to be tricky to define unsafe levels.
Looks like Either one wants it or don't want interference from it. Are there any
users changing the default value?
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