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Message-ID: <aWd2wquw1aEB2rON@wieczorr-mobl1.localdomain>
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2026 12:17:13 +0000
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <m.wieczorretman@...me>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@...gle.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, joonki.min@...sung-slsi.corp-partner.google.com, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm/kasan: Fix KASAN poisoning in vrealloc()

Tested in generic and sw_tags modes. Compiles and runs okay with and without my
KASAN sw tags patches on x86. Kunit tests also seem fine.

Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com>

On 2026-01-13 at 20:15:15 +0100, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>A KASAN warning can be triggered when vrealloc() changes the requested
>size to a value that is not aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE.
>
>    ------------[ cut here ]------------
>    WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at mm/kasan/shadow.c:174 kasan_unpoison+0x40/0x48
>    ...
>    pc : kasan_unpoison+0x40/0x48
>    lr : __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc+0x40/0x68
>    Call trace:
>     kasan_unpoison+0x40/0x48 (P)
>     vrealloc_node_align_noprof+0x200/0x320
>     bpf_patch_insn_data+0x90/0x2f0
>     convert_ctx_accesses+0x8c0/0x1158
>     bpf_check+0x1488/0x1900
>     bpf_prog_load+0xd20/0x1258
>     __sys_bpf+0x96c/0xdf0
>     __arm64_sys_bpf+0x50/0xa0
>     invoke_syscall+0x90/0x160
>
>Introduce a dedicated kasan_vrealloc() helper that centralizes
>KASAN handling for vmalloc reallocations. The helper accounts for KASAN
>granule alignment when growing or shrinking an allocation and ensures
>that partial granules are handled correctly.
>
>Use this helper from vrealloc_node_align_noprof() to fix poisoning
>logic.
>
>Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@...gle.com>
>Reported-by: <joonki.min@...sung-slsi.corp-partner.google.com>
>Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANP3RGeuRW53vukDy7WDO3FiVgu34-xVJYkfpm08oLO3odYFrA@mail.gmail.com
>Fixes: d699440f58ce ("mm: fix vrealloc()'s KASAN poisoning logic")
>Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
>---
> include/linux/kasan.h |  6 ++++++
> mm/kasan/shadow.c     | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> mm/vmalloc.c          |  7 ++-----
> 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
>index 9c6ac4b62eb9..ff27712dd3c8 100644
>--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
>+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
>@@ -641,6 +641,9 @@ kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
> 		__kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, flags);
> }
> 
>+void kasan_vrealloc(const void *start, unsigned long old_size,
>+		unsigned long new_size);
>+
> #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
> 
> static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
>@@ -670,6 +673,9 @@ kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
> 			  kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
> { }
> 
>+static inline void kasan_vrealloc(const void *start, unsigned long old_size,
>+				unsigned long new_size) { }
>+
> #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
> 
> #if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
>diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
>index 32fbdf759ea2..e9b6b2d8e651 100644
>--- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
>+++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
>@@ -651,6 +651,30 @@ void __kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> 	kasan_poison(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID, false);
> }
> 
>+void kasan_vrealloc(const void *addr, unsigned long old_size,
>+		unsigned long new_size)
>+{
>+	if (!kasan_enabled())
>+		return;
>+
>+	if (new_size < old_size) {
>+		kasan_poison_last_granule(addr, new_size);
>+
>+		new_size = round_up(new_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>+		old_size = round_up(old_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>+		if (new_size < old_size)
>+			__kasan_poison_vmalloc(addr + new_size,
>+					old_size - new_size);
>+	} else if (new_size > old_size) {
>+		old_size = round_down(old_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>+		__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr + old_size,
>+					new_size - old_size,
>+					KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL |
>+					KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC |
>+					KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
>+	}
>+}
>+
> #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
> 
> int kasan_alloc_module_shadow(void *addr, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask)
>diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
>index 41dd01e8430c..2536d34df058 100644
>--- a/mm/vmalloc.c
>+++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
>@@ -4322,7 +4322,7 @@ void *vrealloc_node_align_noprof(const void *p, size_t size, unsigned long align
> 		if (want_init_on_free() || want_init_on_alloc(flags))
> 			memset((void *)p + size, 0, old_size - size);
> 		vm->requested_size = size;
>-		kasan_poison_vmalloc(p + size, old_size - size);
>+		kasan_vrealloc(p, old_size, size);
> 		return (void *)p;
> 	}
> 
>@@ -4330,16 +4330,13 @@ void *vrealloc_node_align_noprof(const void *p, size_t size, unsigned long align
> 	 * We already have the bytes available in the allocation; use them.
> 	 */
> 	if (size <= alloced_size) {
>-		kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(p + old_size, size - old_size,
>-				       KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL |
>-				       KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC |
>-				       KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
> 		/*
> 		 * No need to zero memory here, as unused memory will have
> 		 * already been zeroed at initial allocation time or during
> 		 * realloc shrink time.
> 		 */
> 		vm->requested_size = size;
>+		kasan_vrealloc(p, old_size, size);
> 		return (void *)p;
> 	}
> 
>-- 
>2.52.0
>

-- 
Kind regards
Maciej Wieczór-Retman


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