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Message-ID: <CALEuBan7V-YVTyLif29E0hZx9nacbxJG1xSL6DspxEctDbdtLg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 02:56:24 +0800
From: 齐柯宇 <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
To: heikki.krogerus@...ux.intel.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org
Cc: andersson@...nel.org, linux-usb@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] usb: typec: mux: fix NULL pointer dereference in {typec_switch,mux}_put
This fix was discovered through static code analysis.
In typec_switch_put() and typec_mux_put(), the code directly dereferences
sw_dev->dev.parent->driver->owner without checking if 'driver' is NULL.
This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference kernel crash.
[Call Chain Analysis]
The vulnerable functions are called through the following paths:
Acquisition path (fwnode_typec_switch_get):
typec_port_register() [class.c]
-> typec_switch_get() [typec_mux.h]
-> fwnode_typec_switch_get() [mux.c]
-> class_find_device() (gets device reference)
-> try_module_get(sw_devs[i]->dev.parent->driver->owner)
-> stores to sw->sw_devs[i]
Release path (typec_switch_put):
typec_release() [class.c]
-> typec_switch_put() [mux.c]
-> module_put(sw_dev->dev.parent->driver->owner) <- BUG!
-> put_device(&sw_dev->dev)
Registration path (typec_switch_register):
I2C/Platform driver probe()
-> typec_switch_register(dev, &sw_desc) [mux.c]
-> sw_dev->dev.parent = parent (sets parent device)
-> device_add(&sw_dev->dev)
[Data Flow Analysis]
The critical data flow is:
sw_dev->dev.parent:
- Set by typec_switch_register() from the 'parent' parameter
- Typically an I2C or Platform device (e.g., &client->dev)
sw_dev->dev.parent->driver:
- Managed by kernel driver model (drivers/base/dd.c)
- Set to driver pointer when driver binds (really_probe)
- Set to NULL when driver unbinds (__device_release_driver)
[Race Condition Scenario]
The vulnerability can be triggered by the following race condition:
Thread A (normal operation) Thread B (attacker/event)
---------------------------- -------------------------
T1: typec_port_register()
T2: fwnode_typec_switch_get()
T3: try_module_get(parent->driver->owner)
T4: store sw_devs[i]
...
T5: echo <dev> > unbind
T6: device_driver_detach()
T7: parent->driver = NULL
T8: typec_switch_put(sw)
T9: module_put(parent->driver->owner)
-> NULL pointer dereference!
[User-Triggerable Paths]
Users can trigger this vulnerability through:
1. sysfs unbind interface (requires root):
# echo "<device>" > /sys/bus/i2c/drivers/<driver>/unbind
2. Module unloading (requires root):
# rmmod <switch_driver_module>
3. USB Type-C hot-unplug (physical access):
Physically removing the USB-C device or its parent device
How to fix:
Add NULL checks for both 'parent' and 'parent->driver' before calling
module_put() in typec_switch_put() and typec_mux_put().
Fixes: 71793b579ba68 ("usb: typec: mux: Allow multiple mux_devs per mux")
Signed-off-by: Kery Qi <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
---
drivers/usb/typec/mux.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/mux.c b/drivers/usb/typec/mux.c
index 182c902c42f6..6ed8bb999ee0 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/mux.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/mux.c
@@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ void typec_switch_put(struct typec_switch *sw)
for (i = 0; i < sw->num_sw_devs; i++) {
sw_dev = sw->sw_devs[i];
- module_put(sw_dev->dev.parent->driver->owner);
+ if (sw_dev->dev.parent && sw_dev->dev.parent->driver)
+ module_put(sw_dev->dev.parent->driver->owner);
put_device(&sw_dev->dev);
}
kfree(sw);
@@ -358,7 +359,8 @@ void typec_mux_put(struct typec_mux *mux)
for (i = 0; i < mux->num_mux_devs; i++) {
mux_dev = mux->mux_devs[i];
- module_put(mux_dev->dev.parent->driver->owner);
+ if (mux_dev->dev.parent && mux_dev->dev.parent->driver)
+ module_put(mux_dev->dev.parent->driver->owner);
put_device(&mux_dev->dev);
}
kfree(mux);
--
2.34.1
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