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Message-ID: <CALEuBan7Knm3G3eXPd8BZ37jVQFtRs7fAssts+picVKHBjGBqQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 03:43:37 +0800
From: 齐柯宇 <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
To: nick@...anahar.org, dmitry.torokhov@...il.com
Cc: rydberg@...omail.se, jy0922.shim@...sung.com, bleung@...omium.org,
ezequiel@...guardiasur.com.ar, linux-input@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 齐柯宇 <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix NULL pointer dereference in mxt_object_show
This fix was discovered through static code analysis.
In mxt_object_show(), the code directly dereferences data->info and
data->object_table without checking if they are NULL. This can lead to
a NULL pointer dereference kernel crash when the sysfs file is accessed
during firmware update or device removal.
[Call Chain Analysis]
The vulnerable sysfs handler is exposed through the following registration:
Driver registration:
mxt_driver.driver.dev_groups = mxt_groups
-> mxt_attrs[] contains:
- dev_attr_object.attr -> mxt_object_show() [VULNERABLE]
- dev_attr_update_fw.attr -> mxt_update_fw_store()
[TRIGGERS FREE]
Initialization path:
mxt_probe()
-> mxt_initialize()
-> mxt_read_info_block()
-> data->info = (struct mxt_info *)id_buf [line 1918]
-> data->object_table = (struct mxt_object *)... [line 1934]
Resource release path (called during firmware update or device removal):
mxt_update_fw_store() OR mxt_remove()
-> mxt_free_object_table()
-> data->object_table = NULL [line 1713]
-> data->info = NULL [line 1714]
[Data Flow Analysis]
The critical data flow is:
data->info:
- Allocated and set in mxt_read_info_block() from id_buf
- Released and set to NULL in mxt_free_object_table()
- Accessed in mxt_object_show() at line 2868: data->info->object_num
data->object_table:
- Set in mxt_read_info_block() as pointer into id_buf
- Set to NULL in mxt_free_object_table()
- Accessed in mxt_object_show() at line 2869: data->object_table + i
[Race Condition Scenario]
The vulnerability can be triggered by the following race condition:
Thread A (reading sysfs) Thread B (firmware update)
-------------------------- --------------------------
T1: open /sys/.../object
T2: mxt_object_show()
T3: data = dev_get_drvdata(dev)
T4: obuf = kmalloc(...)
T5: echo fw > /sys/.../update_fw
T6: mxt_update_fw_store()
T7: mxt_free_object_table()
T8: data->info = NULL
T9: for (i < data->info->object_num)
-> NULL pointer dereference!
[User-Triggerable Paths]
Users can trigger this vulnerability through:
1. Firmware update race condition (requires root):
Terminal A: # cat /sys/bus/i2c/devices/<dev>/object
Terminal B: # echo firmware.bin > /sys/bus/i2c/devices/<dev>/update_fw
2. Device unbind race condition (requires root):
Terminal A: # cat /sys/bus/i2c/devices/<dev>/object
Terminal B: # echo "<dev>" > /sys/bus/i2c/drivers/atmel_mxt_ts/unbind
3. Physical device removal:
Reading sysfs while physically removing the touchscreen device
How to fix:
Add NULL checks for data->info and data->object_table at the beginning
of mxt_object_show() to prevent NULL pointer dereference when these
resources are freed during concurrent firmware update or device removal.
Fixes: 4cf51c383d7a ("Input: Add ATMEL QT602240 touchscreen driver")
Fixes: 068bdb67ef74 ("Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix the firmware update")
Signed-off-by: Kery Qi <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
---
drivers/input/touchscreen/atmel_mxt_ts.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/atmel_mxt_ts.c
b/drivers/input/touchscreen/atmel_mxt_ts.c
index dd0544cc1bc1..401fcae2264d 100644
--- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/atmel_mxt_ts.c
+++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/atmel_mxt_ts.c
@@ -2859,6 +2859,10 @@ static ssize_t mxt_object_show(struct device *dev,
int error;
u8 *obuf;
+ /* Check for NULL to prevent race condition during firmware update */
+ if (!data->info || !data->object_table)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
/* Pre-allocate buffer large enough to hold max sized object. */
obuf = kmalloc(256, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!obuf)
--
2.34.1
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