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Message-ID: <2026011554-chute-sloppily-34bb@gregkh>
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 07:34:19 +0100
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: 齐柯宇 <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
Cc: heikki.krogerus@...ux.intel.com, andersson@...nel.org,
linux-usb@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] usb: typec: mux: fix NULL pointer dereference in
{typec_switch,mux}_put
On Thu, Jan 15, 2026 at 02:56:24AM +0800, 齐柯宇 wrote:
> This fix was discovered through static code analysis.
>
> In typec_switch_put() and typec_mux_put(), the code directly dereferences
> sw_dev->dev.parent->driver->owner without checking if 'driver' is NULL.
> This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference kernel crash.
>
> [Call Chain Analysis]
> The vulnerable functions are called through the following paths:
>
> Acquisition path (fwnode_typec_switch_get):
> typec_port_register() [class.c]
> -> typec_switch_get() [typec_mux.h]
> -> fwnode_typec_switch_get() [mux.c]
> -> class_find_device() (gets device reference)
> -> try_module_get(sw_devs[i]->dev.parent->driver->owner)
> -> stores to sw->sw_devs[i]
>
> Release path (typec_switch_put):
> typec_release() [class.c]
> -> typec_switch_put() [mux.c]
> -> module_put(sw_dev->dev.parent->driver->owner) <- BUG!
> -> put_device(&sw_dev->dev)
>
> Registration path (typec_switch_register):
> I2C/Platform driver probe()
> -> typec_switch_register(dev, &sw_desc) [mux.c]
> -> sw_dev->dev.parent = parent (sets parent device)
> -> device_add(&sw_dev->dev)
>
> [Data Flow Analysis]
> The critical data flow is:
>
> sw_dev->dev.parent:
> - Set by typec_switch_register() from the 'parent' parameter
> - Typically an I2C or Platform device (e.g., &client->dev)
>
> sw_dev->dev.parent->driver:
> - Managed by kernel driver model (drivers/base/dd.c)
> - Set to driver pointer when driver binds (really_probe)
> - Set to NULL when driver unbinds (__device_release_driver)
>
> [Race Condition Scenario]
> The vulnerability can be triggered by the following race condition:
>
> Thread A (normal operation) Thread B (attacker/event)
> ---------------------------- -------------------------
> T1: typec_port_register()
> T2: fwnode_typec_switch_get()
> T3: try_module_get(parent->driver->owner)
> T4: store sw_devs[i]
> ...
> T5: echo <dev> > unbind
> T6: device_driver_detach()
Are you sure that at this point things don't get synced up?
> T7: parent->driver = NULL
> T8: typec_switch_put(sw)
> T9: module_put(parent->driver->owner)
> -> NULL pointer dereference!
A parent should never be null.
>
> [User-Triggerable Paths]
> Users can trigger this vulnerability through:
It's not a "vulnerability" given the definition of that word.
> 1. sysfs unbind interface (requires root):
> # echo "<device>" > /sys/bus/i2c/drivers/<driver>/unbind
>
> 2. Module unloading (requires root):
> # rmmod <switch_driver_module>
>
> 3. USB Type-C hot-unplug (physical access):
> Physically removing the USB-C device or its parent device
I don't think that removing the device can cause this, have you tried?
What AI tool wrote this? You always have to document your tools, right?
thanks,
greg k-h
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