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Message-ID: <CAMj1kXFXNo1-pMbo-VZrjQ3TYe1tufebrLr_avL12A0nHMSGnA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2026 10:41:48 +0100
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@...ux.ibm.com>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>, "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@...nel.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>, Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>, Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>, Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
"moderated list:ARM64 PORT (AARCH64 ARCHITECTURE)" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
"open list:S390 ARCHITECTURE" <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:EXTENSIBLE FIRMWARE INTERFACE (EFI)" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS_INTEGRITY" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide
On Thu, 15 Jan 2026 at 01:43, Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> EVM and other LSMs need the ability to query the secure boot status of
> the system, without directly calling the IMA arch_ima_get_secureboot
> function. Refactor the secure boot status check into a general,
> integrity-wide function named arch_integrity_get_secureboot.
>
> Define a new Kconfig option CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT, which is
> automatically configured by the supported architectures. The existing
> IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT Kconfig loads the architecture specific
> IMA policy based on the refactored secure boot status code.
>
> Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
> arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 5 --
> arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c | 13 +++++
> arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/s390/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
> arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c | 6 --
> arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c | 9 +++
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 4 +-
> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/ima.h | 7 +--
> include/linux/integrity.h | 8 +++
> security/integrity/Kconfig | 6 ++
> security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +
> security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 47 +---------------
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +-
> security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 2 +-
> 21 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c
> create mode 100644 arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> index 93173f0a09c7..4c265b7386bb 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -2427,6 +2427,7 @@ config EFI
> select EFI_STUB
> select EFI_GENERIC_STUB
> imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
> + imply INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT
This allows both to be en/disabled individually, which I don't think
is what we want. It also results in more churn across the
arch-specific Kconfigs than needed.
Wouldn't it be better if IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT 'select'ed
INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT in its Kconfig definition?
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