linux-kernel - [PATCH] mm/kfence: randomize the freelist on initialization

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Message-ID: <20260120161510.3289089-1-pimyn@google.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 17:15:10 +0100
From: Pimyn Girgis <pimyn@...gle.com>
To: pimyn@...gle.com
Cc: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, elver@...gle.com, dvyukov@...gle.com, 
	glider@...gle.com, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] mm/kfence: randomize the freelist on initialization

Randomize the KFENCE freelist during pool initialization to make allocation
patterns less predictable. This is achieved by shuffling the order in which
metadata objects are added to the freelist using get_random_u32_below().

Additionally, ensure the error path correctly calculates the address range
to be reset if initialization fails, as the address increment logic has
been moved to a separate loop.

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Pimyn Girgis <pimyn@...gle.com>
---
 mm/kfence/core.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 577a1699c553..9e8b3cfd3f76 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h)
 static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
 {
 	unsigned long addr, start_pfn;
-	int i;
+	int i, rand;
 
 	if (!arch_kfence_init_pool())
 		return (unsigned long)__kfence_pool;
@@ -647,13 +647,27 @@ static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta->list);
 		raw_spin_lock_init(&meta->lock);
 		meta->state = KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED;
-		meta->addr = addr; /* Initialize for validation in metadata_to_pageaddr(). */
-		list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
+		/* Use addr to randomize the freelist. */
+		meta->addr = i;
 
 		/* Protect the right redzone. */
-		if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE)))
+		if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + 2 * i * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE)))
 			goto reset_slab;
+	}
+
+	for (i = CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i > 0; i--) {
+		rand = get_random_u32_below(i);
+		swap(kfence_metadata_init[i - 1].addr, kfence_metadata_init[rand].addr);
+	}
 
+	for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+		struct kfence_metadata *meta_1 = &kfence_metadata_init[i];
+		struct kfence_metadata *meta_2 = &kfence_metadata_init[meta_1->addr];
+
+		list_add_tail(&meta_2->list, &kfence_freelist);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+		kfence_metadata_init[i].addr = addr;
 		addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
 	}
 
@@ -666,6 +680,7 @@ static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
 	return 0;
 
 reset_slab:
+	addr += 2 * i * PAGE_SIZE;
 	for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) {
 		struct page *page;
 
-- 
2.52.0.457.g6b5491de43-goog