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Message-ID: <1783975.1769190197@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2026 17:43:17 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
cc: dhowells@...hat.com, Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-modules@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: IMA and PQC
Hi Mimi,
I've posted patches which I hope will accepted to implement ML-DSA module
signing:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/1753972.1769166821@warthog.procyon.org.uk/T/#t
but for the moment, it will give an error to pkcs7_get_digest() if there's no
digest available (which there won't be with ML-DSA). This means that there
isn't a hash for IMA to get at for TPM measurement.
Now, I probably have to make a SHA256 hash anyway for UEFI blacklisting
purposes, so that could be used. Alternatively, we can require the use of
authenticatedAttributes/signedAttrs and give you the hash of that - but then
you're a bit at the mercy of whatever hashes were used.
Further, we need to think how we're going to do PQC support in IMA -
particularly as the signatures are so much bigger and verification slower.
Would ML-DSA-44 be acceptable? Should we grab some internal state out of
ML-DSA to use in lieu of a hash?
David
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