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Message-ID: <aXZMLbQ2ykqPQp48@kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2026 19:00:29 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, maddy@...ux.ibm.com,
mpe@...erman.id.au, npiggin@...il.com, christophe.leroy@...roup.eu,
James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
nayna@...ux.ibm.com, stefanb@...ux.ibm.com, rnsastry@...ux.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into
trusted_tpm_options
On Fri, Jan 23, 2026 at 10:25:04PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
>
> Define trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
> there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in trusted_key_options's
> private.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@...ux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
> include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 +++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 103 ++++++++++++++--------
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 62 ++++++++-----
> 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> index 03527162613f..b80f250305b8 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
>
> struct trusted_key_options {
> uint16_t keytype;
> - uint32_t keyhandle;
> - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t blobauth_len;
> - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
> - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
> - int pcrlock;
> - uint32_t hash;
> - uint32_t policydigest_len;
> - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - uint32_t policyhandle;
> void *private;
> };
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> index 0fadc6a4f166..355ebd36cbfd 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> @@ -7,6 +7,20 @@
>
> extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>
> +struct trusted_tpm_options {
> + uint32_t keyhandle;
> + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t blobauth_len;
> + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
> + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
> + int pcrlock;
> + uint32_t hash;
> + uint32_t policydigest_len;
> + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + uint32_t policyhandle;
> +};
> +
> int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options);
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index 636acb66a4f6..0ab0234ebe37 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ enum {
> #if TPM_DEBUG
> static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = o->private;
TPM context is obvious i.e., actually private would be a better name.
> +
> pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
> - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
> - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
> - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
> + pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", tpm_opts->keyhandle);
> + pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrlock);
> + pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
> print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> + 16, 1, tpm_opts->pcrinfo, tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> }
Should be replaced with pr_debug() and KERN_DEBUG as precursory patch
(and remove TPM_DEBUG).
>
> static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> @@ -624,6 +626,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
> static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct tpm_buf tb;
> int ret;
>
> @@ -634,9 +637,12 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
> p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
>
> - ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
> + tpm_opts = o->private;
Not sure why this is not done in the declaration.
> +
> + ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth,
> p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
> - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
> + tpm_opts->blobauth, tpm_opts->pcrinfo,
> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>
> @@ -650,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> struct trusted_key_options *o)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct tpm_buf tb;
> int ret;
>
> @@ -657,8 +664,10 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
> - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
> + tpm_opts = o->private;
> +
> + ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, tpm_opts->keyhandle, tpm_opts->keyauth, p->blob,
> + p->blob_len, tpm_opts->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> else
> @@ -695,6 +704,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> struct trusted_key_options *opt)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> char *p = c;
> int token;
> @@ -710,7 +720,9 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> if (tpm2 < 0)
> return tpm2;
>
> - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
> + tpm_opts = opt->private;
> +
I'd remove this empty line.
> + tpm_opts->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>
> if (!c)
> return 0;
> @@ -724,11 +736,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>
> switch (token) {
> case Opt_pcrinfo:
> - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
> - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
> + if (tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
> - opt->pcrinfo_len);
> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
> + tpm_opts->pcrinfo_len);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> break;
> @@ -737,12 +749,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
> - opt->keyhandle = handle;
> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = handle;
> break;
> case Opt_keyauth:
> if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->keyauth, args[0].from,
> SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -753,21 +765,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
> * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
> */
> - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>
> - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
> - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from,
> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
> break;
> }
>
> - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
> - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
> - opt->blobauth_len);
> + if (tpm2 &&
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len <=
> + sizeof(tpm_opts->blobauth)) {
> + memcpy(tpm_opts->blobauth, args[0].from,
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
> break;
> }
>
> @@ -785,14 +799,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->pcrlock = lock;
> + tpm_opts->pcrlock = lock;
> break;
> case Opt_hash:
> if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
> return -EINVAL;
> for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
> if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
> - opt->hash = i;
> + tpm_opts->hash = i;
> break;
> }
> }
> @@ -804,14 +818,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> }
> break;
> case Opt_policydigest:
> - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
> + digest_len = hash_digest_size[tpm_opts->hash];
> if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
> return -EINVAL;
> - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
> + res = hex2bin(tpm_opts->policydigest, args[0].from,
> digest_len);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
> + tpm_opts->policydigest_len = digest_len;
> break;
> case Opt_policyhandle:
> if (!tpm2)
> @@ -819,7 +833,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
> if (res < 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - opt->policyhandle = handle;
> + tpm_opts->policyhandle = handle;
> break;
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -830,6 +844,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>
> static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct trusted_key_options *options;
> int tpm2;
>
> @@ -842,14 +857,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> /* set any non-zero defaults */
> options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
>
> - if (!tpm2)
> - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> + tpm_opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*tpm_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tpm_opts) {
> + kfree_sensitive(options);
> + options = NULL;
> + } else {
> + if (!tpm2)
> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> +
> + options->private = tpm_opts;
> + }
> }
> return options;
> }
>
> static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL;
> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
> int ret = 0;
> int tpm2;
> @@ -867,7 +891,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> dump_options(options);
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -881,20 +907,22 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> }
>
> - if (options->pcrlock) {
> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> + if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) {
> + ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock);
> if (ret < 0) {
> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> goto out;
> }
> }
> out:
> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
> kfree_sensitive(options);
> return ret;
> }
>
> static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts = NULL;
> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
> int ret = 0;
> int tpm2;
> @@ -912,7 +940,9 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> goto out;
> dump_options(options);
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -924,14 +954,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> if (ret < 0)
> pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>
> - if (options->pcrlock) {
> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> + if (tpm_opts->pcrlock) {
> + ret = pcrlock(tpm_opts->pcrlock);
> if (ret < 0) {
> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> goto out;
> }
> }
> out:
> + kfree_sensitive(options->private);
> kfree_sensitive(options);
> return ret;
> }
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 6340823f8b53..568c4af9010c 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u8 *src, u32 len)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
> u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
> @@ -46,7 +47,9 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
> asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
>
> - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len == 0) {
> unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
> /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
> w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
> @@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> goto err;
> }
>
> - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
> + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, tpm_opts->keyhandle);
> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
>
> @@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u8 **buf)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> int ret;
> struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
> u8 *blob;
> @@ -120,8 +124,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> if (!blob)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> *buf = blob;
> - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
> + tpm_opts->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>
> memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
> blob += ctx.priv_len;
> @@ -233,6 +239,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
> int blob_len = 0;
> @@ -240,11 +247,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> u32 flags;
> int rc;
>
> - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(tpm_opts->hash);
> if (hash < 0)
> return hash;
>
> - if (!options->keyhandle)
> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
> @@ -268,18 +277,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> goto out_put;
> }
>
> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto out;
>
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
> - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + tpm_opts->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> /* sensitive */
> - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
> + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>
> - if (options->blobauth_len)
> - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
> + if (tpm_opts->blobauth_len)
> + tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->blobauth,
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
>
> tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
> tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
> @@ -292,14 +302,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>
> /* key properties */
> flags = 0;
> - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
> + flags |= tpm_opts->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
> flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
> tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
>
> /* policy */
> - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
> - if (options->policydigest_len)
> - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
> + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest_len);
> + if (tpm_opts->policydigest_len)
> + tpm_buf_append(&sized, tpm_opts->policydigest,
> + tpm_opts->policydigest_len);
>
> /* public parameters */
> tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
> @@ -373,6 +384,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> u32 *blob_handle)
> {
> u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct tpm_buf buf;
> unsigned int private_len;
> unsigned int public_len;
> @@ -391,8 +403,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> blob_ref = blob;
> }
>
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
> - if (!options->keyhandle)
> + if (!tpm_opts->keyhandle)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
> @@ -433,11 +447,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> return rc;
> }
>
> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, tpm_opts->keyhandle, NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto out;
>
> - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
> + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, tpm_opts->keyauth,
> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
> @@ -481,6 +495,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_options *options,
> u32 blob_handle)
> {
> + struct trusted_tpm_options *tpm_opts;
> struct tpm_header *head;
> struct tpm_buf buf;
> u16 data_len;
> @@ -502,10 +517,12 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> if (rc)
> goto out;
>
> - if (!options->policyhandle) {
> + tpm_opts = options->private;
> +
> + if (!tpm_opts->policyhandle) {
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
> - options->blobauth,
> - options->blobauth_len);
> + tpm_opts->blobauth,
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
> } else {
> /*
> * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
> @@ -518,9 +535,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
> * password.
> */
> - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
> + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, tpm_opts->policyhandle,
> NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
> - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
> + tpm_opts->blobauth,
> + tpm_opts->blobauth_len);
> if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
> } else {
> --
> 2.43.0
>
BR, Jarkko
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