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Message-ID: <anhtxco52jz2ktmxlittsjuvfqybwrwgy76bjhni3j5dzx2rh2@hpzf3sfwe7hf>
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 16:55:13 +0000
From: Rodrigo Alencar <455.rodrigo.alencar@...il.com>
To: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...el.com>,
Rodrigo Alencar <455.rodrigo.alencar@...il.com>
Cc: rodrigo.alencar@...log.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-iio@...r.kernel.org, devicetree@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@...nel.org>, David Lechner <dlechner@...libre.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andy@...nel.org>, Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@...afoo.de>,
Michael Hennerich <Michael.Hennerich@...log.com>, Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt@...nel.org>, Conor Dooley <conor+dt@...nel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] iio: core: add fixed point parsing with 64-bit
parts
On 26/01/26 06:07PM, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 03:30:44PM +0000, Rodrigo Alencar wrote:
> > On 26/01/26 03:20PM, Rodrigo Alencar wrote:
> > > On 26/01/26 04:53PM, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 02:26:20PM +0000, Rodrigo Alencar wrote:
>
> ...
>
> > > > Why? Can you elaborate how checking amount of digits is different to
> > > > check_mul_overflow()?
> > >
> > > consider U64_MAX = 18_446_744_073_709_551_615 as the limit:
> > > - 19_000_000_000_000_000_000 contains the same amount of digits but overflows.
> > > - 18_446_744_073_710_000_000 contains the same amount of digits but overflows.
> > >
> > > to catch those cases, we need to check for the overflow, everytime we read a
> > > character and accumulate:
> > >
> > > u64 acc;
> > >
> > > while(isdigit(*str))
> > > if (check_mul_overflow(acc, 10, &acc) ||
> > > check_add_overflow(acc, *str - '0', &acc))
> > > return -EOVERFLOW;
> > >
> > > *res = acc;
> > >
> > > acc can get weird results if not checked.
> >
> > Thinking about it again, that check could be done only in the last step
> > (20th for u64)
>
> Does kstrto*() also perform only last check? I think they do for each
> iteration.
It does the following:
...
if (unlikely(res & (~0ull << 60))) {
if (res > div_u64(ULLONG_MAX - val, base))
rv |= KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW;
}
...
so overflow is checked when either one of the 4 MSbits are set.
for now, I am thinking of something like:
static ssize_t iio_safe_strtou64(const char *str, const char **endp,
size_t max_chars, u64 *result)
{
u64 digit, acc = 0;
size_t idx = 0;
while (isdigit(*str) && idx < max_chars) {
digit = *str - '0';
if (unlikely(idx > 19)) {
if (check_mul_overflow(acc, 10, &acc) ||
check_add_overflow(acc, digit, &acc))
return -EOVERFLOW;
} else {
acc = acc * 10 + digit;
}
str++;
idx++;
}
*endp = str;
*result = acc;
return idx;
}
which would help the truncation when parsing the fractional part
with max_chars, avoiding a div64_u64() to adjust precision:
...
digit_count = iio_safe_strtou64(str, &end, SIZE_MAX, &i);
if (digit_count < 0)
return digit_count;
if (precision && *end == '.') {
str = end + 1;
digit_count = iio_safe_strtou64(str, &end, precision, &f);
if (digit_count < 0)
return digit_count;
if (digit_count < precision) /* scale up */
f *= int_pow(10, precision - digit_count);
while (isdigit(*end)) /* truncate */
end++;
}
...
but I understand you would not like this approach, because it does not use
simple_strtoull() or kstrtoull(). Problem is simple_strtoull() is not
overflow-safe and kstrtoull() does not allow to track a pointer to end
of the string.
Given that the current implementation of iio_str_to_fixpoint() is not using
simple_strtoull() I am not seeing an issue with this approach.
Kind regards,
Rodrigo Alencar
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