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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSgbHx4NcMVjMMk0D332b0DTEQi6dD_wO1fvQne-JVisw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 17:52:03 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ucount: check for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE using ns_capable_noaudit()
On Thu, Jan 22, 2026 at 9:25 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> The user.* sysctls implement the ctl_table_root::permissions hook and
> they override the file access mode based on the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
> capability (at most rwx if capable, at most r-- if not). The capability
> is being checked unconditionally, so if an LSM denies the capability, an
> audit record may be logged even when access is in fact granted.
>
> Given the logic in the set_permissions() function in kernel/ucount.c and
> the unfortunate way the permission checking is implemented, it doesn't
> seem viable to avoid false positive denials by deferring the capability
> check. Thus, do the same as in net_ctl_permissions() (net/sysctl_net.c)
> - switch from ns_capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), so that the check
> never logs an audit record.
>
> Fixes: dbec28460a89 ("userns: Add per user namespace sysctls.")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
> ---
> kernel/ucount.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
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