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Message-ID: <0f6212c1-7034-42f4-ba77-10e9ec52a4f5@arm.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 16:06:58 +0100
From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>
To: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@...wei.com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc: catalin.marinas@....com, oleg@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 05/16] arm64: ptrace: Move rseq_syscall() before
audit_syscall_exit()
On 27/01/2026 12:34, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>> [...]
>>
>>> I'm also concerned that rseq_debug_update_user_cs()
>>> operates on instruction_pointer(regs) which is something that can be
>>> chaned by ptrace.
>> Isn't that true regardless of where rseq_syscall() is called on the
>> syscall exit path, though?
> My understanding is that if instruction_pointer(regs) is hijacked and
> modified via ptrace at the syscall exit (ptrace_report_syscall_exit()),
> this modification will not be observed by rseq. Specifically, in the
> generic entry syscall exit path, rseq_syscall() is unable to detect such
> a PC modification.
Good point. So concretely that means that currently on arm64, one could
make the rseq debug check pass/fail by using the syscall exit trap to
modify PC. OTOH this is impossible with generic entry because the rseq
check is performed first. I'm not sure this is a feature anyone has even
noticed, but it is a user-visible change indeed.
- Kevin
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