[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20260127083719.1347209-1-wangqing7171@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 16:37:19 +0800
From: Qing Wang <wangqing7171@...il.com>
To: henryzhangjcle@...il.com
Cc: acme@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org,
mingo@...hat.com,
peterz@...radead.org,
syzbot+2a077cb788749964cf68@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com,
zeri@...ch.edu
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix data race in perf_event_set_bpf_handler()
On Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 10:36, Henry Zhang <henryzhangjcle@...il.com> wrote:
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index a0fa488bce84..1f3ed9e87507 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ static inline int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event,
> return -EPROTO;
> }
>
> - event->prog = prog;
> + WRITE_ONCE(event->prog, prog);
> event->bpf_cookie = bpf_cookie;
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -10407,7 +10407,9 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
> if (event->attr.aux_pause)
> perf_event_aux_pause(event->aux_event, true);
>
> - if (event->prog && event->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> + struct bpf_prog *prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog);
> +
> + if (prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
> !bpf_overflow_handler(event, data, regs))
> goto out;
Looking at this code, I guess there may be an serious issue: a potential
use-after-free (UAF) risk when accessing event->prog in __perf_event_overflow.
CPU 0 (interrupt context) CPU 1 (process context)
read event->prog
perf_event_free_bpf_handler()
put(prog)
free(prog)
access memory pointed to by prog
This scenario need to be more analysis.
--
Qing
Powered by blists - more mailing lists