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Message-ID: <aXqYnh92VWroe8AJ@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2026 01:15:42 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>, Ignat Korchagin <ignat@...udflare.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com>,
Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@...nel.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-modules@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 3/7] pkcs7, x509: Rename ->digest to ->m
On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 02:29:24PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Rename ->digest and ->digest_len to ->m and ->m_size to represent the input
> to the signature verification algorithm, reflecting that ->digest may no
> longer actually *be* a digest.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>
> cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@...udflare.com>
> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
> cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 4 ++--
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 28 ++++++++++++------------
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 3 +--
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 2 +-
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 10 ++++-----
> include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 ++--
> 7 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> index 348966ea2175..2326743310b1 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> @@ -593,10 +593,10 @@ static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
> {
> struct public_key_signature sig = {
> .s_size = params->in2_len,
> - .digest_size = params->in_len,
> + .m_size = params->in_len,
> .encoding = params->encoding,
> .hash_algo = params->hash_algo,
> - .digest = (void *)in,
> + .m = (void *)in,
> .s = (void *)in2,
> };
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> index 6d6475e3a9bf..aa085ec6fb1c 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
>
> /* The digest was calculated already. */
> - if (sig->digest)
> + if (sig->m)
> return 0;
>
> if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
> @@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
>
> desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
> - sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
> + sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
>
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> - sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!sig->digest)
> + sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!sig->m)
> goto error_no_desc;
>
> desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -59,11 +59,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> desc->tfm = tfm;
>
> /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
> - ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
> - sig->digest);
> + ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, sig->m);
> if (ret < 0)
> goto error;
> - pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
> + pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->m);
>
> /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
> * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
> @@ -78,14 +77,14 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> goto error;
> }
>
> - if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
> + if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->m_size) {
> pr_warn("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
> sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
> ret = -EBADMSG;
> goto error;
> }
>
> - if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
> + if (memcmp(sig->m, sinfo->msgdigest,
> sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
> pr_warn("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
> sinfo->index);
> @@ -98,7 +97,8 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
> * hash it.
> */
> - memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
> + memset(sig->m, 0, sig->m_size);
> +
>
> ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
> if (ret < 0)
> @@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> if (ret < 0)
> goto error;
> ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
> - sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
> + sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->m);
> if (ret < 0)
> goto error;
> - pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
> + pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->m);
> }
>
> error:
> @@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - *buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
> - *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
> + *buf = sinfo->sig->m;
> + *len = sinfo->sig->m_size;
>
> i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
> sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index e5b177c8e842..a46356e0c08b 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -425,8 +425,7 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
> if (ret)
> goto error_free_key;
>
> - ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size,
> - sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
> + ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size, sig->m, sig->m_size);
>
> error_free_key:
> kfree_sensitive(key);
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
> index 041d04b5c953..f4ec126121b3 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
> @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig)
> for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->auth_ids); i++)
> kfree(sig->auth_ids[i]);
> kfree(sig->s);
> - kfree(sig->digest);
> + kfree(sig->m);
> kfree(sig);
> }
> }
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> index 79cc7b7a0630..3854f7ae4ed0 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> @@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
> }
>
> desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
> - sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
> + sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
>
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> - sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!sig->digest)
> + sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!sig->m)
> goto error;
>
> desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -76,9 +76,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
>
> desc->tfm = tfm;
>
> - ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size,
> - sig->digest);
> -
> + ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->m);
> if (ret < 0)
> goto error_2;
>
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 81098e00c08f..bd38ba4d217d 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
> struct public_key_signature {
> struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[3];
> u8 *s; /* Signature */
> - u8 *digest;
> + u8 *m; /* Message data to pass to verifier */
> u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
> - u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> + u32 m_size; /* Number of bytes in ->m */
> const char *pkey_algo;
> const char *hash_algo;
> const char *encoding;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> index 457c0a396caf..87be85f477d1 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - pks.digest = (u8 *)data;
> - pks.digest_size = datalen;
> + pks.m = (u8 *)data;
> + pks.m_size = datalen;
> pks.s = hdr->sig;
> pks.s_size = siglen;
> ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);
>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
BR, Jarkko
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