linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Explicitly configure supported XSS from {svm,vmx}_set_cpu

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <0eff82fe-e3e9-43bb-907f-3279163489f0@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2026 10:55:28 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>, John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>,
 Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Explicitly configure supported XSS from
 {svm,vmx}_set_cpu_caps()

On 1/28/2026 9:43 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Explicitly configure KVM's supported XSS as part of each vendor's setup
> flow to fix a bug where clearing SHSTK and IBT in kvm_cpu_caps, e.g. due
> to lack of CET XFEATURE support, makes kvm-intel.ko unloadable when nested
> VMX is enabled, i.e. when nested=1.  The late clearing results in
> nested_vmx_setup_{entry,exit}_ctls() clearing VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_LOAD_CET_STATE
> when nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs() runs during the CPU compatibility checks,
> ultimately leading to a mismatched VMCS config due to the reference config
> having the CET bits set, but every CPU's "local" config having the bits
> cleared.
> 
> Note, kvm_caps.supported_{xcr0,xss} are unconditionally initialized by
> kvm_x86_vendor_init(), before calling into vendor code, and not referenced
> between ops->hardware_setup() and their current/old location.

I'm thinking whether to move the initialization of supported_xss from 
kvm_x86_vendor_init() to kvm_setup_xss_caps(). Anyway it can be a 
separate patch, if we agree to make the change.

For this fixing patch,

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>

> Fixes: 69cc3e886582 ("KVM: x86: Add XSS support for CET_KERNEL and CET_USER")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>
> Cc: John Allen <john.allen@....com>
> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
> Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  2 ++
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  2 ++
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.h     |  2 ++
>   4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 7803d2781144..c00a696dacfc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -5387,6 +5387,8 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
>   	 */
>   	kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT);
>   	kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IMM);
> +
> +	kvm_setup_xss_caps();
>   }
>   
>   static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 27acafd03381..9f85c3829890 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -8230,6 +8230,8 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
>   		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
>   		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
>   	}
> +
> +	kvm_setup_xss_caps();
>   }
>   
>   static bool vmx_is_io_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 8acfdfc583a1..cac1d6a67b49 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -9965,6 +9965,23 @@ static struct notifier_block pvclock_gtod_notifier = {
>   };
>   #endif
>   
> +void kvm_setup_xss_caps(void)
> +{
> +	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
> +		kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
> +
> +	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> +	    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> +		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
> +
> +	if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) != XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) {
> +		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> +		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
> +		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
> +	}
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_setup_xss_caps);
> +
>   static inline void kvm_ops_update(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
>   {
>   	memcpy(&kvm_x86_ops, ops->runtime_ops, sizeof(kvm_x86_ops));
> @@ -10138,19 +10155,6 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
>   	if (!tdp_enabled)
>   		kvm_caps.supported_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
>   
> -	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
> -		kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
> -
> -	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> -	    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> -		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
> -
> -	if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) != XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) {
> -		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> -		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
> -		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
> -	}
> -
>   	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control) {
>   		/*
>   		 * Make sure the user can only configure tsc_khz values that
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index 70e81f008030..94d4f07aaaa0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -483,6 +483,8 @@ extern struct kvm_host_values kvm_host;
>   extern bool enable_pmu;
>   extern bool enable_mediated_pmu;
>   
> +void kvm_setup_xss_caps(void);
> +
>   /*
>    * Get a filtered version of KVM's supported XCR0 that strips out dynamic
>    * features for which the current process doesn't (yet) have permission to use.