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Message-Id: <20260130125326.44456-1-alexandernesterenko837@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 13:53:26 +0100
From: Aleksandr Nesterenko <alexandernesterenko837@...il.com>
To: kvalo@...eaurora.org,
davem@...emloft.net,
kuba@...nel.org
Cc: linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Aleksandr Nesterenko <alexandernesterenko837@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] wifi: ath9k: add range check for epid in htc_issue_send()
The fix for CVE-2024-53156 (commit 8619593634cb ("wifi: ath9k: add
range check for conn_rsp_epid in htc_connect_service()")) added a
bounds check for conn_rsp_epid in htc_connect_service() to prevent
out-of-bounds array access. However, htc_issue_send() accesses
target->endpoint[epid] directly without validating the epid parameter.
While htc_connect_service() now validates the endpoint ID before storing
it, htc_issue_send() can still receive invalid epid values from callers
such as htc_send() and htc_send_epid(). This provides defense-in-depth
against out-of-bounds access.
Fixes: fb9987d0f748 ("ath9k_htc: Support for AR9271 chipset.")
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nesterenko <alexandernesterenko837@...il.com>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c
index 00dc97ac53b9..7821a31c0abb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c
@@ -23,9 +23,16 @@ static int htc_issue_send(struct htc_target *target, struct sk_buff* skb,
{
struct htc_frame_hdr *hdr;
- struct htc_endpoint *endpoint = &target->endpoint[epid];
+ struct htc_endpoint *endpoint;
int status;
+ if (epid >= ENDPOINT_MAX) {
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ endpoint = &target->endpoint[epid];
+
hdr = skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct htc_frame_hdr));
hdr->endpoint_id = epid;
hdr->flags = flags;
--
2.34.1
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