linux-kernel - [PATCH] crypto: pkcs7 - use constant-time digest comparison

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Message-ID: <20260201035503.3945067-1-hodgesd@meta.com>
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2026 19:55:03 -0800
From: Daniel Hodges <hodgesd@...a.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>,
        Ignat
 Korchagin <ignat@...udflare.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
CC: <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Daniel Hodges <hodgesd@...a.com>
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: pkcs7 - use constant-time digest comparison

Replace memcmp() with crypto_memneq() when comparing message digests
during PKCS#7 signature verification.

memcmp() is not constant-time and returns early on the first byte
mismatch. This creates a timing side-channel that could allow an
attacker to forge valid signatures by measuring verification time
and recovering the expected digest value byte-by-byte.

crypto_memneq() performs a constant-time comparison, eliminating
the timing oracle.

This affects all users of PKCS#7 signature verification including:
 - Kernel module signature verification (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
 - Firmware signature verification
 - Kexec image signature verification
 - IMA appraisal

Fixes: 9f0d33146e2a ("PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data message")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Hodges <hodgesd@...a.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 6d6475e3a9bf..c69cd240bd7e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -4,20 +4,21 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@...hat.com)
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
 
 /*
  * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
  */
 static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 			struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
@@ -78,22 +79,22 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 			goto error;
 		}
 
 		if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
 			pr_warn("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
 				sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
 			ret = -EBADMSG;
 			goto error;
 		}
 
-		if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
-			   sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+		if (crypto_memneq(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
+				  sinfo->msgdigest_len)) {
 			pr_warn("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
 				sinfo->index);
 			ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
 			goto error;
 		}
 
 		/* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
 		 * as the contents of the digest instead.  Note that we need to
 		 * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
 		 * hash it.
-- 
2.47.3