Message-ID: <aYZ5m5iJ_h_2wqw_@google.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2026 15:30:35 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Zhangjiaji <zhangjiaji1@...wei.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "Wangqinxiao (Tom)" <wangqinxiao@...wei.com>, 
	zhangyashu <zhangyashu2@...artners.com>, "wangyanan (Y)" <wangyanan55@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [BUG REPORT] USE_AFTER_FREE in complete_emulated_mmio found by
 KASAN/Syzkaller fuzz test (v5.10.0)

On Mon, Feb 02, 2026, Zhangjiaji wrote:
> Syzkaller hit 'KASAN: use-after-free Read in complete_emulated_mmio' bug.
> 
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420
> Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984
> 
> CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace:
> dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd
> print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170
> __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84
> kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
> check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0
> memcpy+0x20/0x60
> complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420
> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0
> kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20
> __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160
> do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
> RIP: 0033:0x42477d
> Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005
> RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720
> 
> The buggy address belongs to the page:
> page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37
> flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
> raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000
> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> 
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
> ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
> >ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>                                                  ^
> ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
> ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ==================================================================
> 
> 
> Syzkaller reproducer:
> # {Threaded:true Repeat:true RepeatTimes:0 Procs:1 Slowdown:1 Sandbox: SandboxArg:0 Leak:false NetInjection:false NetDevices:false NetReset:false Cgroups:false BinfmtMisc:false CloseFDs:false KCSAN:false DevlinkPCI:false NicVF:false USB:false VhciInjection:false Wifi:false IEEE802154:false Sysctl:false Swap:false UseTmpDir:false HandleSegv:true Repro:false Trace:false LegacyOptions:{Collide:false Fault:false FaultCall:0 FaultNth:0}}
> r0 = openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000001c0), 0x0, 0x0)
> r1 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VM(r0, 0xae01, 0x0)
> r2 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x0) syz_kvm_setup_cpu$x86(r1, r2, &(0x7f0000fe2000/0x18000)=nil, &(0x7f0000000080)=[@text32={0x20, &(0x7f0000000000)="44c8df2020c020c003000000000f22c0671e26653e360f2224660f65b600000000b9e0450200f5e8f5e8f30f1ed6c744240000100000c744240200000000c7442406000000000f011424eacf5700000301b8010000000f01c1", 0x59}], 0x1, 0x27, 0x0, 0x1) ioctl$KVM_RUN(r2, 0xae80, 0x0) ioctl$KVM_SMI(0xffffffffffffffff, 0xaeb7) (async) ioctl$KVM_RUN(r2, 0xae80, 0x0)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------
> Hi,
> 
> I've analyzed the Syzkaller output and the complete_emulated_mmio() code
> path.  The buggy address is created in em_enter(), where it passes its local
> variable `ulong rbp` to emulate_push(), finally ends in
> emulator_read_write_onepage() putting the address into
> vcpu->mmio_fragments[].data .  The bug happens when kvm guest executes an
> "enter" instruction, and top of the stack crosses the mem page.  In that
> case, the em_enter() function cannot complete the instruction within itself,
> but leave the rest data (which is in the other page) to
> complete_emulated_mmio().  When complete_emulated_mmio() starts, em_enter()
> has exited, so local variable `ulong rbp` is also released.  Now
> complete_emulated_mmio() trys to access vcpu->mmio_fragments[].data , and the
> bug happened.
> 
> any idea?

Egad, sorry!  I had reproduced this shortly after you sent the report and prepped
a fix, but got distracted and lost this in my inbox.

Can you test this on your end?  I repro'd by modifying a KVM-Unit-Test and hacking
KVM to tweak the stack, so I haven't confirmed the syzkaller version.

It's a bit gross, as it abuses an unused field as scratch space, but AFAICT that's
"fine".  The alternative would be add a dedicated field, which seems like overkill?

I'm also going to try and add a WARN to detect if the @val parameter passed to
emulator_read_write() is ever on the kernel stack, e.g. to help detect lurking
bugs like this one without relying on kasahn.

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index c8e292e9a24d..dacef51c2565 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -1897,13 +1897,12 @@ static int em_enter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
        int rc;
        unsigned frame_size = ctxt->src.val;
        unsigned nesting_level = ctxt->src2.val & 31;
-       ulong rbp;
 
        if (nesting_level)
                return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 
-       rbp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
-       rc = emulate_push(ctxt, &rbp, stack_size(ctxt));
+       ctxt->memop.orig_val = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
+       rc = emulate_push(ctxt, &ctxt->memop.orig_val, stack_size(ctxt));
        if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
                return rc;
        assign_masked(reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP), reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP),

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