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Message-ID: <20061129055857.GJ2826@MAIL.13thfloor.at>
Date:	Wed, 29 Nov 2006 06:58:57 +0100
From:	Herbert Poetzl <herbert@...hfloor.at>
To:	Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@...ibm.com>
Cc:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Dmitry Mishin <dim@...nvz.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	Linux Containers <containers@...ts.osdl.org>, hadi@...erus.ca,
	Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@...l.org>
Subject: Re: Network virtualization/isolation

On Tue, Nov 28, 2006 at 09:26:52PM +0100, Daniel Lezcano wrote:
> Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>  > I do not want to get into a big debate on the merits of various
>  > techniques at this time.  We seem to be in basic agreement
>  > about what we are talking about.
>  >
>  > There is one thing I think we can all agree upon.
>  > - Everything except isolation at the network device/L2 layer, does not
>  >   allow guests to have the full power of the linux networking stack.
> Agree.
>  >
>  > - There has been a demonstrated use for the full power of the linux
>  >   networking stack in containers..
> Agree.
>  >
>  > - There are a set of techniques which look as though they will give
>  >   us full speed when we do isolation of the network stack at the
>  >   network device/L2 layer.
> Agree.
> 
>  > Is there any reason why we don't want to implement network namespaces
>  > without the full power of the linux network stack?
> Don't make me wrong, I never said layer 2 should not be used. I am only
> arguing a layer 3 should use the mechanism provided by the layer 2 and
> use a subset of it like the sockets virtualization/isolation.
> 
> Just IP isolation for lightweight containers, applications containers in
> order to have mobility.
> 
>  > If there is a case where we clearly don't want the full power of the
>  > linux network stack in a guest but we still need a namespace we can
>  > start looking at the merits of the alternatives.
> Dmitry and I, we are looking for a l3 based on a subset of the l2 and
> according with Herbert needs.
> If we can provide a l3 isolation based on the l2 which:
>   - does not collide with l2
>   - fit the needs of Herbert
>   - allows the migration
>   - use common code between l2 and l3
> Should it not be sufficient to justify to have a l3 with the l2 
> isolation?

sounds good to me ...

>  >> What is this new paradigm you are talking about ?
>  >
>  > The basic point is this.  The less like stock linux the inside of a
>  > container looks, and the more of a special case it is the more
>  > confusing it is.  The classic example is that for a system container
>  > routing packets between containers over the loopback interface is
>  > completely unexpected.
> 
> Right for system container, but not necessary for application containers.

yep

best,
Herbert

>  >> There is not extra networking data structure instantiation in the
>  >> Daniel's L3.
>  > Nope just an extra field which serves the same purpose.
>  >
>  >>> - Bind/Connect/Accept filtering.  There are so few places in
>  >>>   the code this is easy to maintain without sharing code with
>  >>>   everyone else.
>  >> For isolation too ? Can we build network migration on top of that ?
> 
>  > As long as you can take your globally visible network address with you
>  > when you migrate you can build network migration on top of it.  So yes
>  > bind/accept filtering is sufficient to implement migration, if you are
>  > only using IP based protocols.
> 
> When you migrate an application, you must cleanup related sockets on the
> source machine. The cleanup can not rely on the IP addresses because you
> will be not able to discriminate all the sockets related to the
> container. Another stuff is the network objects life-cycle, the
> container will die when the application will finish, the timewait
> sockets will stay until all data are flushed to peer. You can not
> restart a new container with the same IP address, so you need to monitor
> the socket before relaunching a new container or unmounting the aliased
> interface associated with the container. You need a ref counting for the
> container and this refcount is exactly what has the network namespace.
> Another example, you can not have several application binding to
> INADDR_ANY:port without conflict. The multiport instantiation is exactly
> what brings the sockets isolation/virtualization with the l2/l3.
> 
> _______________________________________________
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