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Date:	Thu, 22 Mar 2007 15:23:50 -0600
From:	Joy Latten <latten@...tin.ibm.com>
To:	David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:	selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, netdev@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
	vyekkirala@...stedcs.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH]: Add security check before flushing SAD/SPD

On Thu, 2007-03-22 at 12:01 -0700, David Miller wrote:
> From: Joy Latten <latten@...tin.ibm.com>
> Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2007 12:35:39 -0600
> 
> > Within selinux we check for authorization before deleting entries from
> > SAD and SPD. 
> > 
> > We are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and
> > the SAD. It was perhaps missed in original patch.
> > 
> > This patch adds security check when flushing entries from SAD and SPD.
> > 
> > Please let me know if this patch is ok.
> > It was built against linux-2.6.21-rc4-git5. I have also tested it.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@...tin.ibm.com>
> 
> I don't understand this and it does not sit well with me.
> 
> If we are flushing the policy database, we are flushing it
> regardless of what the security layer might or might not say.
> 
> I would look at this patch differently if there were some
> security level key being checked for a match here, which is
> an input key to the flush, but that is not what is happening
> here as the object is being looked at by itself.

Yes, I understand what you are saying.
I was concerned about having to check each entry
to flush database.

I did this patch because we check for authorization
when deleting single specified entries from the SAD/SPD. It
seem like a hole to me that we check for this, but that same
user/process can delete the entire database with no checks.

Unfortunately, each policy entry or SA can have a different security
label. And that is why I would have to check each entry's
security label before deleting. To see if the user/process has
authorization to delete an entry with that security label.

Including selinux list for suggestions.

Joy

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