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Message-ID: <46D7EBA7.5080807@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2007 18:21:27 +0800
From: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@...fujitsu.com>
To: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
CC: lksctp-developers@...ts.sourceforge.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Lksctp-developers] SCTP: Fix dead loop while received unexpected
chunk with length set to zero
Vlad Yasevich wrote:
> Wei Yongjun wrote:
>
>> Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>>
>>> Wei Yongjun wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> NACK
>>>>>
>>>>> Section 8.4:
>>>>>
>>>>> An SCTP packet is called an "out of the blue" (OOTB) packet if it is
>>>>> correctly formed (i.e., passed the receiver's CRC32c check; see
>>>>> Section 6.8), but the receiver is not able to identify the
>>>>> association to which this packet belongs.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I would argue that the packet is not correctly formed in this case
>>>>> and deserves a protocol violation ABORT in return.
>>>>>
>>>>> -vlad
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> As your comment, patch has been changed.
>>>> Patch has been split to two, one is resolve this dead loop problem in
>>>> this mail.
>>>> And the other is come in another mail to discard partial chunk which
>>>> chunk length is set to zero.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> I am starting to question the entire OOTB packet handling. There are way
>>> too many function that do almost the same thing and all handle OOTB a
>>> little
>>> different.
>>>
>>> sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack() is also called during sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a()
>>> processing, so checking for INIT chunk is wrong. Checking for just the
>>> chunkhdr_t should be enough.
>>>
>>>
>> This has been changed.
>>
>>> sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8 is used directly as well (not just through the state
>>> machine). Not sure if the header verification is appropriate.
>>>
>>>
>> It is needed. Because sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8() is called to handle OOTB
>> packet before check the header length.
>>
>
> But now we are doing the same thing twice (and this is not the only place).
> I know I am being really picky here, but I am starting to thing the ootb handling\
> is a mess and I really don't want to add to the mess.
>
> Until I (or someone else) prove that it's not a mess or fix it, I am going
> to hold off on these patches.
>
> Feel free to go through the spec and fix all the OOTB handling.
>
> Thanks
> -vlad
>
Packet changed:
1. Used sctp_sf_ootb() to handle OOTB packet
2. Remove length check from sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8() in last patch
3. Add length check to sctp_sf_ootb()
4. Changed validity check order in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and other functions to fix possible attack.
This patch may be correct.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@...fujitsu.com>
diff -Nurp a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c 2007-08-17 06:17:14.000000000 -0400
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c 2007-08-19 07:52:17.000000000 -0400
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_stop_t1_a
struct sctp_transport *transport);
static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation(
+ const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands,
@@ -181,6 +182,14 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_4_C(const
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_ulpevent *ev;
+ if (!sctp_vtag_verify_either(chunk, asoc))
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
+ /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE chunk has a valid length. */
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+ commands);
+
/* RFC 2960 6.10 Bundling
*
* An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
@@ -189,9 +198,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_4_C(const
if (!chunk->singleton)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_VIOLATION;
- if (!sctp_vtag_verify_either(chunk, asoc))
- return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-
/* RFC 2960 10.2 SCTP-to-ULP
*
* H) SHUTDOWN COMPLETE notification
@@ -267,6 +273,20 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(
struct sock *sk;
int len;
+ /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length.
+ * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation
+ * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll
+ * just discard the packet.
+ */
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_init_chunk_t)))
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
+ /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification
+ * Tag.
+ */
+ if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0)
+ return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* 6.10 Bundling
* An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
* SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
@@ -295,20 +315,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(
sk_acceptq_is_full(sk)))
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
- /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification
- * Tag.
- */
- if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0)
- return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-
- /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length.
- * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation
- * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll
- * just discard the packet.
- */
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_init_chunk_t)))
- return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-
/* Verify the INIT chunk before processing it. */
err_chunk = NULL;
if (!sctp_verify_init(asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
@@ -591,12 +597,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(co
int error = 0;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chk_p;
- /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the
- * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT.
- */
- if (ep == sctp_sk((sctp_get_ctl_sock()))->ep)
- return sctp_sf_ootb(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-
/* Make sure that the COOKIE_ECHO chunk has a valid length.
* In this case, we check that we have enough for at least a
* chunk header. More detailed verification is done
@@ -605,6 +605,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(co
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the
+ * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT.
+ */
+ if (ep == sctp_sk((sctp_get_ctl_sock()))->ep)
+ return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we
* are in good shape.
*/
@@ -1281,6 +1287,20 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_une
sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param;
int len;
+ /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length.
+ * In this case, we generate a protocol violation since we have
+ * an association established.
+ */
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_init_chunk_t)))
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+ commands);
+
+ /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification
+ * Tag.
+ */
+ if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0)
+ return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* 6.10 Bundling
* An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
* SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
@@ -1293,19 +1313,6 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_une
if (!chunk->singleton)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
- /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification
- * Tag.
- */
- if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0)
- return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-
- /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length.
- * In this case, we generate a protocol violation since we have
- * an association established.
- */
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_init_chunk_t)))
- return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
- commands);
/* Grab the INIT header. */
chunk->subh.init_hdr = (sctp_inithdr_t *) chunk->skb->data;
@@ -2495,6 +2502,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshut
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = (struct sctp_chunk *) arg;
struct sctp_chunk *reply;
+ /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length */
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+ commands);
+
/* Since we are not going to really process this INIT, there
* is no point in verifying chunk boundries. Just generate
* the SHUTDOWN ACK.
@@ -3146,6 +3158,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(const st
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
+ /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+ commands);
+
if (ootb_shut_ack)
sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else
@@ -3240,6 +3257,13 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+
+ /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+ commands);
+
/* Although we do have an association in this case, it corresponds
* to a restarted association. So the packet is treated as an OOTB
* packet and the state function that handles OOTB SHUTDOWN_ACK is
@@ -3654,6 +3678,16 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_discard_chunk
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+
+ /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length.
+ * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general
+ * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison.
+ */
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+ commands);
+
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Chunk %d is discarded\n", type.chunk);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
@@ -3709,6 +3743,13 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation(con
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+
+ /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+ commands);
+
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_VIOLATION;
}
@@ -3716,12 +3757,14 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation(con
* Common function to handle a protocol violation.
*/
static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation(
+ const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands,
const __u8 *payload,
const size_t paylen)
{
+ struct sctp_packet *packet = NULL;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *abort = NULL;
@@ -3730,22 +3773,41 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_
if (!abort)
goto nomem;
- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
- SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
+ if (asoc) {
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
+ SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
- if (asoc->state <= SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED) {
- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
- SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT));
- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
- SCTP_ERROR(ECONNREFUSED));
- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_FAILED,
- SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION));
+ if (asoc->state <= SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED) {
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
+ SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT));
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
+ SCTP_ERROR(ECONNREFUSED));
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_FAILED,
+ SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION));
+ } else {
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
+ SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
+ SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION));
+ SCTP_DEC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
+ }
} else {
- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
- SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
- SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION));
- SCTP_DEC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
+ packet = sctp_ootb_pkt_new(asoc, chunk);
+
+ if (!packet)
+ goto nomem;
+
+ if (sctp_test_T_bit(abort))
+ packet->vtag = ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag);
+
+ abort->skb->sk = ep->base.sk;
+
+ sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet, abort);
+
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT,
+ SCTP_PACKET(packet));
+
+ SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
}
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
@@ -3786,7 +3848,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violat
{
char err_str[]="The following chunk had invalid length:";
- return sctp_sf_abort_violation(asoc, arg, commands, err_str,
+ return sctp_sf_abort_violation(ep, asoc, arg, commands, err_str,
sizeof(err_str));
}
@@ -3805,7 +3867,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violat
{
char err_str[]="The cumulative tsn ack beyond the max tsn currently sent:";
- return sctp_sf_abort_violation(asoc, arg, commands, err_str,
+ return sctp_sf_abort_violation(ep, asoc, arg, commands, err_str,
sizeof(err_str));
}
diff -Nurp a/net/sctp/sm_statetable.c b/net/sctp/sm_statetable.c
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statetable.c 2007-08-09 11:58:11.000000000 -0400
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statetable.c 2007-08-19 05:44:29.000000000 -0400
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ const sctp_sm_table_entry_t *sctp_sm_loo
/* SCTP_STATE_EMPTY */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_CLOSED */ \
- TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8), \
+ TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_discard_chunk), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED */ \
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ const sctp_sm_table_entry_t *sctp_sm_loo
/* SCTP_STATE_EMPTY */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_CLOSED */ \
- TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8), \
+ TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_discard_chunk), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED */ \
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ const sctp_sm_table_entry_t *sctp_sm_loo
/* SCTP_STATE_EMPTY */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_CLOSED */ \
- TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8), \
+ TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_discard_chunk), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED */ \
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ const sctp_sm_table_entry_t *sctp_sm_loo
/* SCTP_STATE_EMPTY */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_CLOSED */ \
- TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8), \
+ TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_violation), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED */ \
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ const sctp_sm_table_entry_t *sctp_sm_loo
/* SCTP_STATE_EMPTY */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_CLOSED */ \
- TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8), \
+ TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_discard_chunk), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED */ \
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ const sctp_sm_table_entry_t *sctp_sm_loo
/* SCTP_STATE_EMPTY */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_CLOSED */ \
- TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8), \
+ TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_discard_chunk), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED */ \
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static const sctp_sm_table_entry_t addip
/* SCTP_STATE_EMPTY */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_CLOSED */ \
- TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8), \
+ TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT */ \
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_discard_chunk), \
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED */ \
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ chunk_event_table_unknown[SCTP_STATE_NUM
/* SCTP_STATE_EMPTY */
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb),
/* SCTP_STATE_CLOSED */
- TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8),
+ TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_ootb),
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_WAIT */
TYPE_SCTP_FUNC(sctp_sf_unk_chunk),
/* SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED */
-
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