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Date:	Fri, 31 Aug 2007 10:38:08 +0800
From:	Wei Yongjun <>
To:	Vlad Yasevich <>
Subject: Re: [Lksctp-developers] SCTP: Fix dead loop while received unexpected
 chunk with length set to zero

Vlad Yasevich wrote:
> Wei Yongjun wrote:
>> Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>>> Wei Yongjun wrote:
>>>> Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>>>>> NACK
>>>>> Section 8.4:
>>>>>    An SCTP packet is called an "out of the blue" (OOTB) packet if it is
>>>>>    correctly formed (i.e., passed the receiver's CRC32c check; see
>>>>>    Section 6.8), but the receiver is not able to identify the
>>>>>    association to which this packet belongs.
>>>>> I would argue that the packet is not correctly formed in this case
>>>>> and deserves a protocol violation ABORT in return.
>>>>> -vlad
>>>> As your comment, patch has been changed.
>>>> Patch has been split to two, one is resolve this dead loop problem in
>>>> this mail.
>>>> And the other is come in another mail to discard partial chunk which
>>>> chunk length is set to zero.
>>> I am starting to question the entire OOTB packet handling.  There are way
>>> too many function that do almost the same thing and all handle OOTB a
>>> little
>>> different.
>>> sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack() is also called during sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a()
>>> processing, so checking for INIT chunk is wrong.  Checking for just the
>>> chunkhdr_t should be enough.
>> This has been changed.
>>> sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8 is used directly as well (not just through the state
>>> machine).  Not sure if the header verification is appropriate.
>> It is needed. Because sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8() is called to handle OOTB
>> packet before check the header length.
> But now we are doing the same thing twice (and this is not the only place).
> I know I am being really picky here, but I am starting to thing the ootb handling\
> is a mess and I really don't want to add to the mess.
> Until I (or someone else) prove that it's not a mess or fix it, I am going
> to hold off on these patches.
> Feel free to go through the spec and fix all the OOTB handling.
> Thanks
> -vlad
Hi vlad:

I think this probleam must be check as soon as possible, because this is 
a security hole. This probleam let SCTP module to be unsafe, if we load 
it, single bad format SCTP packet can make my system dead loop and no 
response to anything, console is freeze too. The same as kernel panic, 
and also can be used to attack other machine by send too many ABORT packet.

May be someone can provide a better patch to this probleam. And I'd 
pleased to see someone to resolve this probleam.

Wei Yongjun

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