netdev - Re: [PATCH 4/4] atm/ambassador: kmalloc + memset conversion to kzalloc

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Message-ID: <b25c3fa70711260253we514310g2652d40440dc514e@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Mon, 26 Nov 2007 19:53:19 +0900
From:	"Joonwoo Park" <joonwpark81@...il.com>
To:	"Robert P. J. Day" <rpjday@...shcourse.ca>
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, chas@....nrl.navy.mil,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] atm/ambassador: kmalloc + memset conversion to kzalloc

2007/11/26, Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@...shcourse.ca>:
> i realized that.  but all you can say is that only amb_init() calls
> setup_dev() *currently*.  when you're not looking, someone else might
> (for whatever reason) call setup_dev() from elsewhere, and *that* call
> might not zero that memory area.
>
> IMHO, the only safe transforms of kmalloc+memset -> kzalloc are those
> in which the flow of control is unmistakable and invariant.  splitting
> that across a function call seems like a dangerous thing to do.
> (except, of course, in the case, where the kzalloc() is added inside
> the function -- then all callers are entitled to simplify *their*
> code.  but that's different.)
>
> in any event, i just thought i'd point it out.  if you're absolutely
> sure there will never be another call to setup_dev() from somewhere
> else, then, yes, it's safe.
>

I understood your opinions. and partially agree with you.
But isn't it a unfounded fear?

Thanks
Joonwoo
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