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Message-ID: <20080103172539.14445.1668.stgit@flek.americas.hpqcorp.net>
Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2008 12:25:39 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: davem@...emloft.net
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] LSM: Add inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook
Add an inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook to allow the LSM to provide packet level
access control for all outbound packets. Using the existing postroute_last
netfilter hook turns out to be problematic as it is can be invoked multiple
times for a single packet, e.g. individual IPsec transforms, adding unwanted
overhead and complicating the security policy.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 7 +++++++
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 5 +++++
security/dummy.c | 8 +++++++-
security/security.c | 6 ++++++
5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index db19c92..1b8d332 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -876,6 +876,10 @@ struct request_sock;
* Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
* @req_classify_flow:
* Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @inet_sys_snd_skb:
+ * Check permissions on outgoing network packets.
+ * @skb is the packet to check
+ * @family is the packet's address family
*
* Security hooks for XFRM operations.
*
@@ -1416,6 +1420,7 @@ struct security_operations {
void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
+ int (*inet_sys_snd_skb)(struct sk_buff *skb, int family);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -2328,6 +2333,7 @@ void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl);
void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
+int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family);
void security_sock_graft(struct sock*sk, struct socket *parent);
int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req);
@@ -2471,6 +2477,11 @@ static inline void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, st
{
}
+static inline int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline void security_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
{
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
index fd99fbd..82a7297 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ static inline int ip_skb_dst_mtu(struct sk_buff *skb)
static int ip_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ int err;
+
#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_XFRM)
/* Policy lookup after SNAT yielded a new policy */
if (skb->dst->xfrm != NULL) {
@@ -211,6 +213,11 @@ static int ip_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
return dst_output(skb);
}
#endif
+
+ err = security_inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, AF_INET);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (skb->len > ip_skb_dst_mtu(skb) && !skb_is_gso(skb))
return ip_fragment(skb, ip_finish_output2);
else
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 6338a9c..44ddf32 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -72,8 +72,13 @@ static __inline__ void ipv6_select_ident(struct sk_buff *skb, struct frag_hdr *f
static int ip6_output_finish(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ int err;
struct dst_entry *dst = skb->dst;
+ err = security_inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, AF_INET6);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (dst->hh)
return neigh_hh_output(dst->hh, skb);
else if (dst->neighbour)
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 0b62f95..384979a 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -848,6 +848,11 @@ static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
struct flowi *fl)
{
}
+
+static inline int dummy_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1122,7 +1127,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
- #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_sys_snd_skb);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3bdcada..7f55459 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -961,6 +961,12 @@ void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
+int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
+{
+ return security_ops->inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, family);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_sys_snd_skb);
+
void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent);
--
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