lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <f73f7ab80802061036u64a56abnccafacf68f2ed717@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 6 Feb 2008 13:36:31 -0500
From:	"Kyle Moffett" <kyle@...fetthome.net>
To:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	davem@...emloft.net
Subject: [NET/IPv6] Race condition with flow_cache_genid?

Whoops, I accidentally sent this to linux-net@...r instead of
netdev@...r.  Original email below:


Hi, I was poking around trying to figure out how to install the Mobile
IPv6 daemons this evening and noticed they required a kernel patch,
although upon further inspection the kernel patch seemed to already be
applied in 2.6.24.  Unfortunately the flow cache appears to be
horribly racy.  Attached below are the only uses of the variable
"flow_cache_genid" in 2.6.24.

Now, I am no expert in this particular area of the code, but the
"atomic_t flow_cache_genid" variable is ONLY ever used with
atomic_inc() and atomic_read().  There are no memory barriers or other
dec_and_test()-style functions, so that variable could just as easily
be replaced with a plain old C int.

Basically either there is some missing locking here or it does not
need to be "atomic_t".  Judging from the way it *appears* to be used
to check if cache entries are up-to-date with the latest changes in
policy, I would guess the former.

In particular that whole "flow_cache_lookup()" thing looks racy as
hell, since somebody could be in the middle of that looking at "if
(fle->genid == atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid))".  It does the
atomic_read(), which BTW is literally implemented as:
  #define atomic_read(atomicvar) ((atomicvar)->value)
on some platforms.  Immediately after the atomic read (or even before,
since there's no cache-flush or read-modify-write), somebody calls
into "selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload()" and increments the
flow_cache_genid becase selinux just loaded a security policy.  Now
we're accepting a cache entry which applies to PREVIOUS security
policy.  I can only assume that's really bad.

Even worse, there seems to be a race between SELinux loading a new
policy and calling selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(), since we could
easily get packets and process them according to the old cache entry
on one CPU before SELinux has had a chance to update the generation ID
from the other.  Furthermore, there's no guarantee the CPU caches will
get updated in reasonable time.  Clearly SELinux needs to have some
way of atomically invalidating the flow cache of all CPUs
*simultaneously* with loading a new policy, which probably means they
both need to be under the same lock, or something.

The same problem appears to occur with updating the XFRM policy and
incrementing flow_cache_genid.  Probably the fastest solution is to
put the flow cache under the xfrm_policy_lock (which already disables
local bottom-halves), and either take that lock during SELinux policy
load or if there are lock ordering problems then add a variable
"flow_cache_ignore" and change the xfrm_notify hooks:

void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload_pre(void)
{
        write_lock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
        flow_cache_genid++;
        flow_cache_ignore = 1;
        write_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
}

void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload_post(void)
{
        write_lock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
        flow_cache_ignore = 0;
        write_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
}

Cheers,
Kyle Moffett


BEGIN QUOTED CODE INVOLVING flow_cache_genid:

include/net/flow.h:94:
extern atomic_t flow_cache_genid;

net/core/flow.c:39:
atomic_t flow_cache_genid = ATOMIC_INIT(0);

net/core/flow.c:169:flow_cache_lookup():
        if (flow_hash_rnd_recalc(cpu))
                flow_new_hash_rnd(cpu);
        hash = flow_hash_code(key, cpu);

        head = &flow_table(cpu)[hash];
        for (fle = *head; fle; fle = fle->next) {
                if (fle->family == family &&
                                fle->dir == dir &&
                                flow_key_compare(key, &fle->key) == 0) {
                        if (fle->genid == atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid)) {
                                void *ret = fle->object;

                                if (ret)
                                        atomic_inc(fle->object_ref);
                                local_bh_enable();

                                return ret;
                        }
                        break;
                }
        }

net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1025:
int xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *pol, int dir)
{
        write_lock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
        pol = __xfrm_policy_unlink(pol, dir);
        write_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
        if (pol) {
                if (dir < XFRM_POLICY_MAX)
                        atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
                xfrm_policy_kill(pol);
                return 0;
        }
        return -ENOENT;
}

net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:142:
static inline
void __inet6_csk_dst_store(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
                struct in6_addr *daddr, struct in6_addr *saddr)
{
        __ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, daddr, saddr);

#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
        {
                struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info  *)dst;
                rt->rt6i_flow_cache_genid = atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid);
        }
#endif
}

security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:41:
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
{
        atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
}
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ