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Message-ID: <47E3148E.1080205@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2008 09:51:10 +0800
From: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@...fujitsu.com>
To: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
CC: lksctp-developers@...ts.sourceforge.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] SCTP: Fix sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac() to avoid kernel panic
Hi Vlad:
Vlad Yasevich wrote:
> Hi Wei
>
> Wei Yongjun wrote:
>> If association is setup with HMAC-ALGO parameter in which there is no
>> HMAC algorithm supported by the endpoint, send a chunk with AUTH will
>> cause kernel panic.
>>
>> This is because when send chunk with AUTH, sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac()
>> will be used to get the hmac. In this function, if the HMAC-ALGO is
>> empty, it return NULL. If is not empty, it will find a valid hmac for
>> using. But if all of the HMAC-ALGOs is not supported by endpoint, it
>> will return a bogus pointer, not expected NULL pointer.
>
> This is a workaround, but this problem must never never happen.
This can happened under attack. I have a test case to found this problem.
> RFC 4890 has the following text:
>
> The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and
> included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter.
>
> As a result, we need to check in sctp_verify_param() that HMAC_SHA1 is
> present in the list. If not, we should probably treat this as a protocol
> violation.
>
> It should also be a protocol violation if the HMAC parameter is empty.
Agree, I will make a patch to fix this.
>
> That could almost remove the need for the sctp-auth_asoc_get_hmac()
> function.
If we do the above check, this function can be removed. I do a test
after the new patch is create.
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