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Message-ID: <20080409205039.26774.50884.stgit@flek.lan>
Date: Wed, 09 Apr 2008 16:50:39 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] NetLabel: Allow passing the LSM domain as a shared
pointer
Smack doesn't have the need to create a private copy of the LSM "domain" when
setting NetLabel security attributes like SELinux, however, the current
NetLabel code requires a private copy of the LSM "domain". This patches fixes
that by letting the LSM determine how it wants to pass the domain value.
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY
The current behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a copy and
frees it when done
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN
New, Smack-friendly behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a
reference to a string managed by the LSM and does not free it when done
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 14 ++++++++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 0ca67d7..5e53a85 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap {
/**
* struct netlbl_lsm_secattr - NetLabel LSM security attributes
- * @flags: indicate which attributes are contained in this structure
+ * @flags: indicate structure attributes, see NETLBL_SECATTR_*
* @type: indicate the NLTYPE of the attributes
* @domain: the NetLabel LSM domain
* @cache: NetLabel LSM specific cache
@@ -180,17 +180,22 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap {
* NetLabel itself when returning security attributes to the LSM.
*
*/
+struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
+ u32 flags;
+ /* bitmap values for 'flags' */
#define NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE 0x00000000
#define NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN 0x00000001
+#define NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY (NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | \
+ NETLBL_SECATTR_FREE_DOMAIN)
#define NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE 0x00000002
#define NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL 0x00000004
#define NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT 0x00000008
#define NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID 0x00000010
+ /* bitmap meta-values for 'flags' */
+#define NETLBL_SECATTR_FREE_DOMAIN 0x01000000
#define NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE (NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL | \
NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT | \
NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
-struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
- u32 flags;
u32 type;
char *domain;
struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache;
@@ -303,7 +308,8 @@ static inline void netlbl_secattr_init(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
*/
static inline void netlbl_secattr_destroy(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- kfree(secattr->domain);
+ if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_FREE_DOMAIN)
+ kfree(secattr->domain);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
netlbl_secattr_cache_free(secattr->cache);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3f2bad2..5fd54f2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2651,7 +2651,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
GFP_ATOMIC);
- secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
if (rc != 0)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 732ba27..e2d6f7c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
switch (smack_net_nltype) {
case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4:
- nlsp->domain = kstrdup(smack, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ nlsp->domain = smack;
nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
--
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