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Message-ID: <48E25F02.8030303@cosmosbay.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2008 19:16:50 +0200
From: Eric Dumazet <dada1@...mosbay.com>
To: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: nhorman@...driver.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
kuznet@....inr.ac.ru, pekkas@...core.fi, jmorris@...ei.org,
yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org, kaber@...sh.net,
Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@....mipt.ru>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: implement emergency route cache rebulds when gc_elasticity
is exceeded
David Miller a écrit :
> From: Eric Dumazet <dada1@...mosbay.com>
> Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2008 08:02:44 +0200
>
>> When a machine is targeted by a DDOS attack, about all slots of the
>> hash table are fully loaded (ie chain length >= elasticity). We dont
>> need to invalidate the cache, but find an equilibrium, with small
>> adjustements.
>
> Sure, but it is possible to determine that some hash chains
> are unevenly growing out of control compared to others,
> and that is the algorithm that Neil is trying to discover.
>
>
No problem, but my suggestion to use a separate threshold than elasticity
was apparently not taken into consideration.
I ran an experiment on a big stable machine with 2^19 rtcache slots,
scanning all chains and found *many* of them having length > elasticity,
maximum being 13. I am sure its allowed by statistics laws.
(average chain length : 3.55)
In order to avoid unecessary cache invalidation, we need some
calculation from a statistics expert.
Given rt_hash_size and elasticity (or rt_max_size), compute the "maximum reasonable"
chain length, ie some X number where probability(chain_length < X) > 0.9999
(CCed Evgeniy Polyakov :) )
MemTotal: 32963064 kB
8 CPUS
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/route/max_size:8388608 (default at boot time)
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/route/gc_thresh:2000000
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/route/gc_elasticity:4
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/route/gc_interval:1
Linux version 2.6.24.5
cat /proc/net/sockstat
sockets: used 957514
TCP: inuse 963998 orphan 7100 tw 10393 alloc 964646 mem 376389
rtstat -c5 -i5 (minus first sample)
rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|rt_cache|
entries| in_hit|in_slow_|in_slow_|in_no_ro| in_brd|in_marti|in_marti| out_hit|out_slow|out_slow|gc_total|gc_ignor|gc_goal_|gc_dst_o|in_hlist|out_hlis|
| | tot| mc| ute| | an_dst| an_src| | _tot| _mc| | ed| miss| verflow| _search|t_search|
1862477| 23758| 4400| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 4142| 1134| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 45754| 11785|
1863310| 24794| 4504| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 4089| 1183| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 47558| 11640|
1863604| 24183| 4383| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 3910| 1061| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 46002| 10819|
1864473| 23899| 4510| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 4113| 1193| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 46451| 11798|
grep ip_dst_cache /proc/slabinfo
ip_dst_cache 1863543 1868660 384 10 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 186866 186866 0
On this machine, a single "ip route flush cache" is risky
(commit 29e75252da20f3ab9e132c68c9aed156b87beae6 [IPV4] route cache: Introduce rt_genid for smooth cache invalidation)
not yet included in kernel)
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