netdev - Re: [PATCH] net: implement emergency route cache rebulds when gc

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Date:	Thu, 02 Oct 2008 10:15:38 +0200
From:	Eric Dumazet <dada1@...mosbay.com>
To:	Bill Fink <billfink@...dspring.com>
Cc:	Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
	David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	kuznet@....inr.ac.ru, pekkas@...core.fi, jmorris@...ei.org,
	yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org, kaber@...sh.net,
	Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@....mipt.ru>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: implement emergency route cache rebulds when gc_elasticity
 is exceeded

Eric Dumazet a écrit :
> Bill Fink a écrit :
>> On Wed, 1 Oct 2008, Neil Horman wrote:
>>
>>> Hey all-
>>>     Since Eric mentioned the use of statistical analysis to determine if
>>> hash chains were growing improperly, I thought I would take a stab at 
>>> such an
>>> approach.  I'm no statistics expert, but it would seem to me that simply
>>> computing the standard deviation of all the non-zero chain lengths 
>>> would give a
>>> good guide point to determine if we needed to invalidate our hash 
>>> table.  I've
>>> written the below implementation.  I've not tested it (I'll be doing 
>>> that here
>>> shortly for the next few days), but I wanted to post it to get 
>>> feedback from you
>>> all on the subject.  The highlights are:
>>>
>>> 1) We add a counter to rt_hash_bucket structure to track the length 
>>> of each
>>> individual chain.  I realize this is sub-optimal, as it adds 
>>> potentially lots of
>>> memory to hash table as a whole (4 bytes * number of hash buckets).  
>>> I'm afraid
>>> I've not come up with a better way to track that yet.  We also track 
>>> the total
>>> number of route entries and the number of non-zero length chains.  
>>> Lastly we
>>> also maintain a global maximum chain length which defines the longest 
>>> chain we
>>> will tolerate in the route table.  This patch defines it as the mean 
>>> chain
>>> length plus one standard deviation.
>>
>> I believe the general rule of thumb for something like this is at
>> least two standard deviations.  For a normal distribution, one standard
>> deviation covers about 68 % of the sample universe, while two standard
>> deviations covers about 95 % (three standard deviations covers 99.73 %).
>> See the Wikipedia entry:
>>
>>     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_deviation
>>
> 
> Thanks Bill for the pointer, this is the trick.
> 
> I believe we should target "4σ 99.993666% " case.
> 
> But we dont need to really compute Standard deviation at runtime, only 
> find an (upper) approximation of it.
> 
> For elasticity=4 and 512*1024 samples (mean < 4), I guess 4σ can be 
> approximated by 20 or something.
> 

Good estimation of Standard Deviation could be computed for free
in rt_check_expire(). (each runs scans 20% of hash table with 
default tunables timeout & ip_rt_gc_interval)

We could update 4σ estimation in this function, every minute (ip_rt_gc_interval)

At softirq time we then can detect a particular hash chain is
longer than 4σ estimation and trigger an appropriate action.

This action is to : flush table, and while we do that, expand hash table
if its current size is under ip_rt_max_size/elasticity...




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