netdev - Re: [PATCH] xen/netfront: do not mark packets of length

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20090114041845.GA8881@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date:	Wed, 14 Jan 2009 15:18:45 +1100
From:	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
To:	Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...rix.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:	jeremy@...p.org, Ian.Campbell@...rix.com, jgarzik@...ox.com,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] xen/netfront: do not mark packets of length < MSS as
	GSO

Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...rix.com> wrote:
> Linux assumes that skbs marked for GSO are longer than MSS. In
> particular tcp_tso_segment assumes that skb_segment will return a
> chain of at least 2 skbs.
> 
> Therefore netfront should not pass such a packet up the stack.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@...rix.com>
> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>
> Cc: jgarzik@...ox.com
> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org

Great catch!

But we should fix this in the stack instead.

gso: Ensure that the packet is long enough

When we get a GSO packet from an untrusted source, we need to
ensure that it is sufficiently long so that we don't end up
crashing.

Based on discovery and patch by Ian Campbell.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index bd6ff90..12e56ec 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, int features)
 	unsigned int seq;
 	__be32 delta;
 	unsigned int oldlen;
-	unsigned int len;
+	unsigned int mss;
 
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*th)))
 		goto out;
@@ -2399,10 +2399,13 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, int features)
 	oldlen = (u16)~skb->len;
 	__skb_pull(skb, thlen);
 
+	mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
+	if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
+		goto out;
+
 	if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
 		/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
 		int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
-		int mss;
 
 		if (unlikely(type &
 			     ~(SKB_GSO_TCPV4 |
@@ -2413,7 +2416,6 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, int features)
 			     !(type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6))))
 			goto out;
 
-		mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
 		skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
 
 		segs = NULL;
@@ -2424,8 +2426,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, int features)
 	if (IS_ERR(segs))
 		goto out;
 
-	len = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
-	delta = htonl(oldlen + (thlen + len));
+	delta = htonl(oldlen + (thlen + mss));
 
 	skb = segs;
 	th = tcp_hdr(skb);
@@ -2441,7 +2442,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, int features)
 			     csum_fold(csum_partial(skb_transport_header(skb),
 						    thlen, skb->csum));
 
-		seq += len;
+		seq += mss;
 		skb = skb->next;
 		th = tcp_hdr(skb);
 

Thanks,
-- 
Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/
Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html