Message-Id: <200901201553.57022.paul.moore@hp.com>
Date:	Tue, 20 Jan 2009 15:53:56 -0500
From:	Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>
To:	Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...ozas.de>
Cc:	Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>,
	Stephan Peijnik <stephan@...jnik.at>,
	"linux-security-module" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	Netfilter Developer Mailing List 
	<netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: RFC: Mandatory Access Control for sockets aka "personal firewalls"

On Tuesday 20 January 2009 3:31:24 pm Jan Engelhardt wrote:
> On Tuesday 2009-01-20 21:15, Samir Bellabes wrote this in IRC:
> >be carefull, you are mixing 2 distincts questions in fact :
> >
> >1. how to have differents security models in the kernel, dealing
> > with the LSM hooks ?
>
> A possible idea would be to not do the traditional LSM chaining,
> but a parallel approach.
>
> The problem with LSM chaining is that it somewhat imposed an order
> on LSMs. The checks in SELinux for example could have decided
> "it's forbidden" and not call out to the secondary module that was
> registered with it. Similarly if my own module was primary and
> selinux was the secondary -- this would potentially lead to me
> having forgotten something in the primary and not calling the
> secondary so selinux would have an inconsistent state of itself.
> Therefore, how about doing a parallel LSM approach:
>
> int security_create_inode(...)
> {
> 	int ret == 0, x;
> 	list_for_each_entry(lsm, ...) {
> 		x = lsm->create_inode(...);
> 		if (x < 0 && ret == 0)
> 			ret = x;
> 	}
> 	return x;
> }
>
> That way, SElinux (which must serve as a beating sample now)
> can update the security context associated with the inode as
> required, but our own modules still has something to say in
> whether the action is penultimately allowed.
>
> There is still an order and would leave question open like
> "if selinux does not like you at all, why bother showing
> a window to the user asking for 'prog xyz tries to bind()'".
>
> But I think it's the direction.

As you noted, the particular problem of resolving the different LSMs 
still exists, including the issue of multiplexing per-object state 
which is likely to be one of the larger roadblocks to such an approach.  
However, in dealing with the issue of personal firewalls I think the 
biggest issue will be the user interaction as you described ... how do 
you explain to a user who clicked the "allow" button that the system 
rejected their traffic?

> >But what you are asking is to have multiple security models at the
> > same time, with some kind of priority.
> >I don't know if it's ok or not, but what I'm sure is that snet will
> > use LSM hooks or your new framework without any problems in fact,
> > as you are going to make some kind of wrapper on the members of the
> > struct security_operations.
>
> jan>>> My opinion up to here would be to split LSM into the LSM
> category
>
> >>> {selinux, apparmor, tomoyo} and the other, new LSM category
> >>> {networking stuff}, just as a potential idea to get over the
> >>> stacking / single LSM use  issue.
> >
> >Indeed I thought about that when writing snet.
>
> For starters, the existing LSM interface and the LSM  modules
> themselves could be split up so as to provide
>
>  selinux.ko
>   \_ selinux_net.ko
>   \_ selinux_fs.ko
>   ...
>
> just a suggestion to ease the thinking process for now.
> If a purely network-related LSM does not have to think about
> "do I need to implement FS hooks that do chaining or not..."
> it is a lot better off.

Unfortunately I don't think this solves the problem, it just changes it 
slightly.  It is no longer "How do I enable SELinux and XXX personal 
firewall?" but instead "How do I enable SELinux's network access 
controls and XXX personal firewall?"

-- 
paul moore
linux @ hp
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