netdev - Re: [PATCH] conntrack: use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU for nf

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Message-ID: <49CA8350.5040407@cosmosbay.com>
Date:	Wed, 25 Mar 2009 20:17:36 +0100
From:	Eric Dumazet <dada1@...mosbay.com>
To:	Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>
CC:	mbizon@...ebox.fr, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund@...nsmode.se>,
	avorontsov@...mvista.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	Netfilter Developers <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] conntrack: use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU for nf_conn structs

Patrick McHardy a écrit :
> Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> Here is take 2 of the patch with proper ref counting on dumping.
> 
> Thanks, one final question about the seq-file handling:
> 
>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c
>> b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c
>> index 6ba5c55..0b870b9 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c
>> @@ -25,30 +25,30 @@ struct ct_iter_state {
>>      unsigned int bucket;
>>  };
>>  
>> -static struct hlist_node *ct_get_first(struct seq_file *seq)
>> +static struct hlist_nulls_node *ct_get_first(struct seq_file *seq)
>>  {
>>      struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
>>      struct ct_iter_state *st = seq->private;
>> -    struct hlist_node *n;
>> +    struct hlist_nulls_node *n;
>>  
>>      for (st->bucket = 0;
>>           st->bucket < nf_conntrack_htable_size;
>>           st->bucket++) {
>>          n = rcu_dereference(net->ct.hash[st->bucket].first);
>> -        if (n)
>> +        if (!is_a_nulls(n))
>>              return n;
>>      }
>>      return NULL;
>>  }
>>  
>> -static struct hlist_node *ct_get_next(struct seq_file *seq,
>> -                      struct hlist_node *head)
>> +static struct hlist_nulls_node *ct_get_next(struct seq_file *seq,
>> +                      struct hlist_nulls_node *head)
>>  {
>>      struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
>>      struct ct_iter_state *st = seq->private;
>>  
>>      head = rcu_dereference(head->next);
>> -    while (head == NULL) {
>> +    while (is_a_nulls(head)) {
>>          if (++st->bucket >= nf_conntrack_htable_size)
>>              return NULL;
>>          head = rcu_dereference(net->ct.hash[st->bucket].first);
>> @@ -56,9 +56,9 @@ static struct hlist_node *ct_get_next(struct
>> seq_file *seq,
>>      return head;
>>  }
>>  
>> -static struct hlist_node *ct_get_idx(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t pos)
>> +static struct hlist_nulls_node *ct_get_idx(struct seq_file *seq,
>> loff_t pos)
>>  {
>> -    struct hlist_node *head = ct_get_first(seq);
>> +    struct hlist_nulls_node *head = ct_get_first(seq);
>>  
>>      if (head)
>>          while (pos && (head = ct_get_next(seq, head)))
>> @@ -87,69 +87,76 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
>>  
>>  static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
>>  {
>> -    const struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *hash = v;
>> -    const struct nf_conn *ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(hash);
>> +    struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *hash = v;
>> +    struct nf_conn *ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(hash);
>>      const struct nf_conntrack_l3proto *l3proto;
>>      const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto;
>> +    int ret = 0;
>>  
>>      NF_CT_ASSERT(ct);
>> +    if (unlikely(!atomic_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use)))
>> +        return 0;
> 
> Can we assume the next pointer still points to the next entry
> in the same chain after the refcount dropped to zero?
> 
> 
> 

We are looking chain N.
If we cannot atomic_inc() refcount, we got some deleted entry.
If we could atomic_inc, we can meet an entry that just moved to another chain X

When hitting its end, we continue the search to the N+1 chain so we only 
skip the end of previous chain (N). We can 'forget' some entries, we can print
several time one given entry.


We could solve this by :

1) Checking hash value : if not one expected -> 
   Going back to head of chain N, (potentially re-printing already handled entries)
   So it is not a *perfect* solution.

2) Use a locking to forbid writers (as done in UDP/TCP), but it is expensive and
wont solve other problem :

We wont avoid emitting same entry several time anyway (this is a flaw of 
current seq_file handling, since we 'count' entries to be skiped, and this is
wrong if some entries were deleted or inserted meanwhile)

We have same problem on /proc/net/udp & /proc/net/tcp, I am not sure we should care...

Also, current resizing code can give to a /proc/net/ip_conntrack reader a problem, since
hash table can switch while its doing its dumping : many entries might be lost or regiven...


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