Message-Id: <200904141944.JFE64074.FHtOMOFQLFJOVS@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date:	Tue, 14 Apr 2009 19:44:35 +0900
From:	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	paul.moore@...com, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] LSM: Add security_socket_post_accept() and security_socket_post_recv_datagram().

Hello.

The security_socket_post_accept() hook was recently removed because this hook
was not used by any in-tree modules and its existence continued to cause
problems by confusing people about what can be safely accomplished using this
hook. Now, TOMOYO became in-tree and TOMOYO wants to add network access control
in 2.6.31.

TOMOYO is not a label based access control and won't cause packet labeling
problem. TOMOYO won't care as long as packets are not copied to userspace.

Regards.
--------------------
Subject: LSM: Add security_socket_post_accept() and security_socket_post_recv_datagram().

This patch allows LSM modules to filter incoming connections/datagrams based on
the process's security context who is attempting to pick up.

There are already hooks for filtering incoming connections/datagrams based on
the socket's security context, but these hooks are not applicable when someone
wants to do TCP Wrapper-like filtering (e.g. App1 is permitted to accept TCP
connections from 192.168.0.0/16) because nobody can tell who picks them up
before the moment of accept()/recvmsg() request.

Precautions: These hooks have a side effect if improperly used.

If a socket is shared by multiple processes with different policy, the process
who should be able to accept this connection will not be able to accept this
connection because socket_post_accept() aborts this connection.
This is needed because the process who must not be able to accept this
connection will repeat accept() request (and consume CPU resource) forever
if socket_post_accept() doesn't abort this connection.

Similarly, if a socket is shared by multiple processes with different policy,
the process who should be able to pick up this datagram will not be able to
pick up this datagram because socket_post_recv_datagram() discards this
datagram.
This is needed because the process who must not be able to pick up this
datagram will repeat recvmsg() request (and consume CPU resource) forever
if socket_post_recv_datagram() doesn't discard this datagram.

Therefore, don't give different policy between processes who share one socket.
Otherwise, some connections/datagrams cannot be delivered to intended process.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@...data.co.jp>

 include/linux/security.h |   39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/core/datagram.c      |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 net/socket.c             |    5 +++++
 security/capability.c    |   13 +++++++++++++
 security/security.c      |   11 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

---

--- security-testing-2.6.git.orig/include/linux/security.h
+++ security-testing-2.6.git/include/linux/security.h
@@ -880,6 +880,17 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
  *	@sock contains the listening socket structure.
  *	@newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_post_accept:
+ *	This hook allows a security module to filter connections from unwanted
+ *	peers based on the process accepting this connection.
+ *	The connection will be aborted if this hook returns nonzero.
+ *	This hook is not designed for updating security attributes of
+ *	an accept()ed socket, for the accept()ed socket has already sent
+ *	several packets (e.g. TCP's SYN/ACK packet and some ACK packets for
+ *	incoming data) before this hook is called.
+ *	@sock contains the listening socket structure.
+ *	@newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @socket_sendmsg:
  *	Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
  *	@sock contains the socket structure.
@@ -893,6 +904,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
  *	@size contains the size of message structure.
  *	@flags contains the operational flags.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_post_recv_datagram:
+ *	Check permission after receiving a datagram.
+ *	This hook allows a security module to filter packets
+ *	from unwanted peers based on the process receiving this datagram.
+ *	The packet will be discarded if this hook returns nonzero.
+ *	@sk contains the socket.
+ *	@skb contains the socket buffer.
+ *	@flags contains the operational flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @socket_getsockname:
  *	Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object
  *	@sock is retrieved.
@@ -1549,10 +1569,13 @@ struct security_operations {
 			       struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
 	int (*socket_listen) (struct socket *sock, int backlog);
 	int (*socket_accept) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+	int (*socket_post_accept) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
 	int (*socket_sendmsg) (struct socket *sock,
 			       struct msghdr *msg, int size);
 	int (*socket_recvmsg) (struct socket *sock,
 			       struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags);
+	int (*socket_post_recv_datagram) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					  unsigned int flags);
 	int (*socket_getsockname) (struct socket *sock);
 	int (*socket_getpeername) (struct socket *sock);
 	int (*socket_getsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
@@ -2530,9 +2553,12 @@ int security_socket_bind(struct socket *
 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+int security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size);
 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 			    int size, int flags);
+int security_socket_post_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       unsigned int flags);
 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock);
 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock);
 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
@@ -2608,6 +2634,12 @@ static inline int security_socket_accept
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock,
+					      struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
 					  struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
@@ -2621,6 +2653,13 @@ static inline int security_socket_recvms
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_socket_post_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk,
+						     struct sk_buff *skb,
+						     unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 {
 	return 0;
--- security-testing-2.6.git.orig/net/core/datagram.c
+++ security-testing-2.6.git/net/core/datagram.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
 #include <net/checksum.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/tcp_states.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 /*
  *	Is a socket 'connection oriented' ?
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(stru
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	long timeo;
+	unsigned long cpu_flags;
 	/*
 	 * Caller is allowed not to check sk->sk_err before skb_recv_datagram()
 	 */
@@ -165,7 +167,6 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(stru
 		 * Look at current nfs client by the way...
 		 * However, this function was corrent in any case. 8)
 		 */
-		unsigned long cpu_flags;
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
 		skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
@@ -179,6 +180,14 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(stru
 		}
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
 
+		/* Filter packets from unwanted peers. */
+		if (skb) {
+			error = security_socket_post_recv_datagram(sk, skb,
+								   flags);
+			if (error)
+				goto force_dequeue;
+		}
+
 		if (skb)
 			return skb;
 
@@ -191,6 +200,24 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(stru
 
 	return NULL;
 
+force_dequeue:
+	/* Drop this packet because LSM says "Don't pass it to the caller". */
+	if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
+		goto no_peek;
+	/*
+	 * If this packet is MSG_PEEK'ed, dequeue it forcibly
+	 * so that this packet won't prevent the caller from picking up
+	 * next packet.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
+	if (skb == skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
+		__skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
+		atomic_dec(&skb->users);
+		/* Do I have something to do with skb->peeked ? */
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
+no_peek:
+	kfree_skb(skb);
 no_packet:
 	*err = error;
 	return NULL;
--- security-testing-2.6.git.orig/net/socket.c
+++ security-testing-2.6.git/net/socket.c
@@ -1519,6 +1519,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto out_fd;
 
+	/* Filter connections from unwanted peers. */
+	err = security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_fd;
+
 	if (upeer_sockaddr) {
 		if (newsock->ops->getname(newsock, (struct sockaddr *)&address,
 					  &len, 2) < 0) {
--- security-testing-2.6.git.orig/security/capability.c
+++ security-testing-2.6.git/security/capability.c
@@ -620,6 +620,11 @@ static int cap_socket_accept(struct sock
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -631,6 +636,12 @@ static int cap_socket_recvmsg(struct soc
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_socket_post_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -1010,8 +1021,10 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_accept);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_recv_datagram);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeername);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt);
--- security-testing-2.6.git.orig/security/security.c
+++ security-testing-2.6.git/security/security.c
@@ -1007,6 +1007,11 @@ int security_socket_accept(struct socket
 	return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock);
 }
 
+int security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	return security_ops->socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+}
+
 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
 	return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
@@ -1018,6 +1023,12 @@ int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socke
 	return security_ops->socket_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags);
 }
 
+int security_socket_post_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return security_ops->socket_post_recv_datagram(sk, skb, flags);
+}
+
 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 {
 	return security_ops->socket_getsockname(sock);
--
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