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Message-Id: <1248376573.7971.19.camel@Maple>
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2009 19:16:13 +0000
From: John Dykstra <john.dykstra1@...il.com>
To: Martin Djernæs <mdjernaes@...z8.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: md5 on listening sockets
On Thu, 2009-07-23 at 16:38 +0200, Martin Djernæs wrote:
> I've been looking at using the md5 keys on a listening socket as one
> means of restricting access to the socket.
MD5 authentication is typically used for BGP sessions. It is not a
particularly strong authentication mechanism, as discussed in RFC 4278,
and there are several better options available as long as you don't have
to be compatible with BGP peers.
> When I specify an md5 key
> (with or without a peer ip address in the option) any tcp connect from
> another IP address will be accepted by this connection if the source
> IP is not found in the "md5sig->keys4" array.
The current behavior is consistent with the way MD5 authentication works
on OpenBSD, and perhaps other BSDs. This behavior is expected by open
source routing applications.
I believe the intent is that the BGP well-known port must be able to
accept connections from both authenticated and non-authenticated peers.
It is up to the application to filter connections based on the address
of the connecting peer.
I agree that this behavior would be unfortunate for a general-purpose
authentication mechanism, but that is not what TCP MD5 authentication
is.
--
John Dykstra
voice: +1 651 484-1098 Yahoo IM: jdykstra72
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/JohnDykstra
Blog: http://johndykstra.blogspot.com/
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