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Message-Id: <20090812.205635.244644770.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 20:56:35 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: herbert@...dor.apana.org.au
Cc: joamaki@...il.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix xfrm hash collisions by changing
__xfrm4_daddr_saddr_hash to hash addresses with addition
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 13:53:10 +1000
> Take corporate VPN servers for instance. Yes each client is
> trusted to the extent that it is being offered connectivity to
> the corporate network. However, it would not be ideal if one
> rogue client can take down the entire VPN server, especially
> in this case because repeatedly creating identical SAs can often
> occur purely by accident.
1) The client is on your private network, much more serious
mischief is possible.
2) Whoever creates such a hash collision explosion can be
precisely identified.
The ikev1 failure case is an interesting situation I hadn't
considered.
Maybe that can matter, but again the guilty party is easy to identify
and easy to block via whatever means appropriate.
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