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Message-Id: <1255106246.2182.219.camel@moss-pluto.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date: Fri, 09 Oct 2009 12:37:26 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Subject: Re: Real networking namespace
On Fri, 2009-10-09 at 08:38 -0700, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> The existing networking namespace model is unattractive for what I want,
> has anyone investigated better alternatives?
>
> I would like to be able to allow access to a network interface and associated objects
> (routing tables etc), to be controlled by Mandatory Access Control API's.
> I.e grant access to eth0 and to only certain processes. Some the issues
> with the existing models are:
> * eth0 and associated objects don't really exist in filesystem so
> not subject to LSM style control (SeLinux/SMACK/TOMOYO)
> * network namespaces do not allow object to exist in multiple namespaces.
> The current model is more restrictive than chroot jails. At least with
> chroot, put filesystem objects in multiple jails.
>
> Since one of the first rules of security is "don't reinvent", surely
> others have dealt with this issue. Any good ideas?
Is there something that prevents you from using the existing SELinux
network access controls? netif is a security class governed by SELinux
policy, and routing table operations would be covered by the SELinux
checks on netlink_route_socket. SELinux uses a combination of LSM hooks
and netfilter hooks to mediate network operations.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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