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Message-ID: <20091216155938.GG15031@basil.fritz.box>
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2009 16:59:38 +0100
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: Michael Stone <michael@...top.org>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, David Lang <david@...g.hm>,
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@...il.com>,
Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@...emap.net>,
"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@...ott.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Bernie Innocenti <bernie@...ewiz.org>,
Mark Seaborn <mrs@...hic-beasts.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Security: Add prctl(PR_{GET,SET}_NETWORK) interface.
On Wed, Dec 16, 2009 at 10:32:43AM -0500, Michael Stone wrote:
> Daniel Bernstein has observed [1] that security-conscious userland processes
> may benefit from the ability to irrevocably remove their ability to create,
> bind, connect to, or send messages except in the case of previously connected
> sockets or AF_UNIX filesystem sockets. We provide this facility by implementing
> support for a new prctl(PR_SET_NETWORK) flag named PR_NETWORK_OFF.
>
> This facility is particularly attractive to security platforms like OLPC
> Bitfrost [2] and to isolation programs like Rainbow [3] and Plash [4].
What would stop them from ptracing someone else running under the same
uid who still has the network access? If you ptrace you can do
arbitary system calls.
-Andi
--
ak@...ux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only.
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